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Abstract
Following 16 years of war in Afghanistan the number of U.S. military, Coalition forces
and Afghan civilian fatalities has exceeded the number of Americans lost on 9/11 and has
cost the United States nearly $841 billion dollars. The results are that Afghanistan
remains in turmoil and that terrorist attacks, the reason for the invasion, continues. The
question is should United States assess a different approach that would result in less
blood and treasure being spent to address the need to mitigate terrorist threats. Guided by
the analysis of conventional- centric and asymmetric-centric approaches to a
counterterrorism strategy, this qualitative study focused on evaluating the effects of U.S.
national strategy for the Afghanistan war between 2001 and 2016. A narrative inquiry
was employed that used extensive in-depth interviews with five implementers and five
recipients of the American strategy based in Afghanistan. The participants were recruited
from the U.S. Special Forces community that implemented American strategy in
Afghanistan, and from Afghans that experienced the American strategy firsthand. Data
were analyzed by employing an inductive coding method. The literature review revealed
an intention to use large military forces to conduct a conventional-centric
counterterrorism strategy, but the narrative inquiry revealed a negative effect of the
conventional-centric counterterrorism strategy. Though more research in this area is
needed the implications from the findings for positive social change that an asymmetriccentric strategy could offer as a possible effective solution for countering terrorism.
These recommendations may help national strategy developers develop a structure to
develop future counterterrorism strategies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in the end of the Cold War and set up the
United States of America as the unipolar power in the world. As a result, most countries
were fast adopting a liberal democracy as their governing means (CITE). It would seem
that developing and maintaining a sustainable national strategy would be much simpler
and easier to achieve following the threat that a nuclear war with the Soviet Union
presented. Yet, for the last 16 years (beginning with the attacks on September 11, 2001
that were quickly followed by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab Spring,
and the Syrian Civil War) suggest that a unipolar strategy based on Cold War experiences
cannot address the complexities of a world where non-state actors influence events,
create crisis, and dominate the public’s attention (Preble, Ashford & Evans, 2016).
Though strategists and policy makers generally embrace the status quo of
implementing a “military first” strategy, there is evidence from results of current
engagements that a new strategy which would address the complexities of the 21st
century social and political challenges is needed. Relative to the rest of the world,
Americans enjoy a considerable degree of security that rarely requires the military to
directly intercede (Hammes, 2005). The Cold War grand strategy of employing a liberal
hegemony of large numbers of forward-deployed troops proved successful in countering
known threats and allowing American to progress through a relative secure environment
(Preble, 2016). There remains the temptation to continue to rely on conventional military
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might to solve 21st century threats that seems to have entrenched itself with strategy
makers (Preble, 2016).
The purpose of a national security strategy is to look beyond the dynamic
challenges in order to provide a framework for the nation’s security efforts to include
countering terrorism (Metz & Johnson, 2001). This purpose is derived, and explained, in
the strategic direction contained in the following documents: the National Security
Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the
Strategy for Counterterrorism (Thomas, 2011). The intention of a national security
strategy is to serve as a foundation that provides guidance for success in existing and
future conflicts against adversaries that challenge or threaten the nation (Metz & Johnson,
2001).
Strategy, like leadership, is one of the most frequently discussed, studied, and
written about concepts in the modern world – especially as it pertains to armed conflict.
An examination of strategy is presented in the book, Strategy: A History, in which the
author states that the term strategy, as the layman understands it, did not come into use
until the 18th century when published philosophers frequently referred to it under the
influence of enlightenment rationalism through the application of reason (Lawrence,
2013). Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, cemented a
legacy in strategy development through the influential work, Art of War, which is
regarded as one of the greatest military textbooks of the 19th century (Freidman, 2013).
Through this publication, Jomini championed the concept that the objective of a winning
strategy is to move resources in order to conduct a decisive battle with an armed
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opponent (Freidman, 2013). Jomini’s teachings have been incorporated at the U.S.
Military and Naval Academies as well as having influenced the works of many 20th
century strategists (Banks, 2011). As a result of their pervasive influence, Jomini’s
precepts have dominated the thinking of generations of American military leaders,
statesmen, and (to some extent) strategic scholars (Banks, 2011). The interpretation of
Jomini’s works can be found in the mass mobilization of manpower and industrial war
materials as a cornerstone of the American strategy (Freidman, 2013). This method of
mobilizing national resources to force a decisive battle (or, more aptly, an overwhelming
application of force to destroy an enemy) established the American strategy for both
World Wars whose battles are studied and cited as a source of martial wisdom today in
U.S. academic and military education centers (Banks, 2011).
Problem Statement
In order to understand the challenges of strategists, it is necessary to know that
strategic challenges are manifestations of variables and trends that pose direct security
challenges to vital interests of the United States. While these challenges individually
present both a threat and opportunity, it is the combination of challenges that offer the
greatest test for U.S. strategy (Abrahms, 2012). Although global in nature, current
challenges to the security of the United States converge dangerously, and immediately, in
the Middle East/South Asia region (Abrahms, 2012). The strategic environment in these
locations is characterized by a dynamic set of political, economic, military, and
social/cultural variables that form the basis for global influence. These variables are laid
out in an increasingly connected and contested information domain (Abrahms, 2012).
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The resultant trends determine complex and somewhat unpredictable forces on the global
stage that requires a viable and measurably successful national security strategy that
enables the nation to respond to threats that these variables present to the nation
(Abrahms, 2012).
The prevailing threat that influenced American national strategy policy from the
end of World War II through the 20th century was the “Soviet menace” of expanding
their influence through both conventional and nuclear war (Kunstler, 2011). This threat
prompted a U.S. defense strategy based on bipolar superpowers that allowed for a
continuity, resulting in the long-term planning and executing of that strategy (Kunstler,
2011). In other terms, the Soviet threat allowed for a strategy based on the symmetry of
countering an adversary’s strength through direct matching of capabilities; consequently,
a strategy was created based on developing tactics, manufacturing materials, and
increasing the personnel requirements for the military that was dictated by their direct
association with the Soviets’ similar capability (Freidman, 2013). This strategy of
symmetry created an arms race during which submarines were created to counter
submarines, tank battalions to counter tank battalions, and nuclear weapons to counter
nuclear weapons (Metz & Johnson, 2010).
Considering the threat that the Soviets directly presented to national security, the
focus for strategists was the development of a military plan based on the symmetry of
resources. Fostering interest in an alternative strategy that would addresses an
asymmetric enemy with the goal to mitigate strength through the asymmetric approach
was not approached in halls of the Pentagon during the Cold War (Schiff, 2012). The end
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of the Cold War found military strategists lacking. They failed to create a viable strategy
for addressing an adversary’s asymmetric strategy of turning strength into a weakness as
employed in the Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia conflict areas. The core of this gap
resulted in a misaligned assumption. U.S. military strategists made decisions concerning
lesser threats according to the then dominant belief that if America could handle the
Soviets, it could easily counter any of the lesser actors (Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis,
2014). What has been proven, instead, is that an asymmetrical war is not a lesser version
of the Cold War and the strategy that was successful for defeating the Soviet threat may
not be successful against an asymmetric foe (Metz & Johnson, 2010, pp. 6–7).
Purpose of the Study
During an interview with Lieutenant General H.R. McMasters (Linnemann,,
2016, pp 17-25) on numerous perceptions and mistakes about the strategy of the War on
Terror engagements. His most important observation was this: “There are two ways to
fight the United States: Asymmetrically and stupid, ‘Asymmetrically’ means, you are
going to try to avoid our strengths” Linnemann,, 2016 p 17). The challenge of a national
strategy that addresses the threat of asymmetric war is the requirement that such a
strategy must be able to innovate to meet the changing environment, adopt new policies
and procedures for meeting strategic goals, and adopt asymmetric warfare as a base for
strategic policies (Linnemann,, 2016, p 20). Such a strategy for the new millennium must
be informed by an understanding of the asymmetric threat and the employment of culture,
determination, and a “long-struggle” methodology of warfare, rather than maintaining the
existing approach of a short, high-tempo conventional (or symmetric) method of warfare
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that relies on a singular, tactical capability designed for a specific niche (Dunlap, 1998).
In short, in order to prevail in a complex world, the United States must employ a strategy
that is more capable of operating in the negative space of asymmetrical war. Students of
Clausewitz understand that a strategist must know the nature of war and, to be successful,
must adapt to the battle at hand (Boot, 2013).
Some scholarly circles have acknowledged that the beginning of the encounter
with asymmetrical war began for the United States in 1983, when a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device detonated inside the headquarters building for the U.S.
Marine Corps operations in Beirut, Lebanon (Hammes, 2005). This building represented
the American political power and involvement in peacekeeping activities in the Middle
East, as well as serving as a symbol of American influence in the region (Hammes,
2005). Though the attack caused the death of 241 Marines and sailors, its impact was
larger than this; it resulted in a decidedly diminished influence of American policy in the
region, and in terror becoming a primary political tool for enemies of the United States
(Banks, 2011). The attack was regarded as a terrorist event and was briefly covered on
Western media outlets. Yet, among the target populations of the Middle East, the attack
was communicated as a demonstration that American power was ineffectual and the nonstate actor, in this case, Hezbollah, was strong (Gunning, 2007). The greater
consequence was the perception that a global power had been neutralized. This
perception, in turn, sent the message to lesser non-state factions and organizations that
orthodox-based power designed on the symmetry of forces is not sustainable in a world
that can employ asymmetric methods to wage war (Boot, 2013, p. 123). Because of the
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withdrawal of American power in that instance, the Beirut attack is considered by
academics and intelligence analysts as the singular incident that challenged the once
successful national security strategy of using direct military and political might to coerce
a society into conforming. This strategy, it became clear, was now obsolete because of
the introduction of a new conflict that required innovative methodologies and strategies
(Toft, 2012). The relevance of asymmetrical warfare has been demonstrated. It is an
effective method to employ many tactics, including terrorism, to overwhelm an adversary
that relies on being superiorly funded, equipped, and trained and that is supported by a
significant technologically-advanced and economically-driven society (DiPaolo, 2005).
Researchers who study the causes and effects of terrorism have paid a great deal
of interest to the social and political structures that create terrorism as well as the
processes and technologies by which the academic circles that focuses on strategy. This
focus, as it applies to the development of strategy, combines academic findings and
opinions with a host of other actors (mostly bureaucrats and analysts) to normalize a
central theme in the policies and strategies as a single valid strategy in understanding the
global impact of terrorism and developing action to respond to it (Stampnitzky, 2013).
Post-9/11/2001, the current counterterrorism industry can be considered to stem from
efforts to redefine or establish terrorism as a sole entity based on previous studies of
conflict (Stampnitzky, 2013). Therefore, current national strategy originates a cause of
both national urgency following the 9/11 attacks and a created industry based on a small
community of academics and professionals redefining a method and tactic as the threat
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instead of the creators of the asymmetric conflict the nation finds itself in (Petraeus,
2013).
There is a clear need for the United States to develop new and innovative
strategies for dealing with asymmetric warfare versus symmetric warfare. It is
problematic that strategists in the U.S. still cling to approaches to warfare that stem from
previous conflicts. The root of this problem began at the end of World War II, when the
United States held political, martial, and economic supremacy compared to the rest of the
world. During that time, the United States also developed unparalleled diplomatic,
economic, and martial influence, all of which challenged the strategies and actions of the
former Soviet Union (Lind, 1994). The successful strategy that allowed for matching and
defeating the Soviet Union was also the weak link in the system: third generation
warfare, which is based on the symmetry of forces that are committed to a major war in
which the objective is to defeat and destroy the opposing nation-state (Hammes, 2005).
This example of third generation warfare is dependent upon a nation’s military excelling
in building a doctrine that establishes budgetary, planning, and training programs in skillsets aimed at defeating a symmetric enemy (Kilcullen, 2011). For the non-state
adversary (such as the terrorist, insurgent, or extremist), the model for defying a stronger
nation-state seems to be impossible to implement; yet the insurgent, terrorist, or extremist
fashioned the version of a fourth method of struggle (Hammes, 2005). This method is
focused on the principle that, in an asymmetrical war, all environmental elements are part
of the conflict (Metz & Johnson, 2010).
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Research Question
“Strategy,” as defined by respected American strategist, Clausewitz (Gatzke,
1942), includes the view that each individual engagement in a war is part of a progression
in order to attain the larger goal of the campaign or war. With this in mind, the strategist
applying the Clausewitzian paradigm believes that the general principles for strategy are
(a) to conquer and destroy the adversary’s armed power; (b) take possession of the
adversary’s resources and sources of economic and political strength; and (c) gain public
opinion (Gatzke, 1942). When developing national strategy, there are aspects of
asymmetric warfare that the strategist must consider; these aspects are currently separate
from traditional warfare strategies. The kind of traditional warfare that Clausewitz
frames as an aspect of strategy is either enemy-centric or terrain-centric warfare,
consisting of an enemy engagement wherein each side bears similar costs (Gatzke, 1942,
p 254). The Clausewitzian view of strategy unintentionally relegates asymmetric warfare
to a secondary status.
Furthermore, the term “strategy” is often misused; there is a tendency for persons
in the field to manipulate the term to mean a general plan or course of action. The reality
of strategy is that it is comprised, not only of plans, but also of the authority of the
national leadership, including the leaders of the state, military, private sector, and other
critical institutions to form an all-inclusive approach that uses national power to control
situations in order to attain national objectives (Yarger, 2015). This characterization of
strategy provides a richer, more comprehensive meaning: that strategy is, at its root,
about control and is fundamentally concerned with the efficient application of different
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types of power in order to achieve national objectives. If we acknowledge the threat that
terrorism and asymmetric adversaries pose to the nation, then the requirement for a
national strategy that addresses the objectives in defeating that type of adversary should
afford greater success.
In this project, the researcher focused on discovering and expounding on the
information that addressed this central question: How does the American strategic
perception of an asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict outcome and are
the Afghan public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive or negative
influence in supporting a strong, stabilized democratic country that is free from terrorist
influence? This question is far-reaching, which allowed for a very broad investigation of
this topic. To mitigate the possibility of vagaries, the researcher used the following
comprehensive questions to support and narrow the research inquiry:
1. How is the effectiveness of conventional military actions in Afghanistan
measured as an asymmetric conflict?
2. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people and Americans implementing
the strategy to combat the terrorist (asymmetric) adversary and the resulting
stability created by the strategy from 2001–2016?
3. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people on the presence of the large
footprint of the international coalition’s forces from 2001–2016 and did it
support or detract from the strategy of removing the threat of terrorism and
stabilizing the country?
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To answer this question, the research methodology used involved such elements
as research “intention, investigation, location, target populace, as well as the
establishment of sample and sampling procedures, research instruments, pilot testing of
the instruments, data collection process, and data analysis procedures” (Creswell, 2013,
p.??). Through data collection and the application of a validation process, the primary
researcher was able to put these elements into perspective. The following section of the
project is of importance to the creditability of the research as it indicates that the research
was conducted in agreement with the required standards.
Theoretical Foundation
As it relates to political or social violence in terrorist activities, many scholars
have attempted to apply conflict theory (symmetrical strategies in warfare) in order to
understand conflict. Though originally developed in economic theory, the assumptions
of conflict theory have also been applied by social scientists investigating the reasons
behind and outcomes of conflict (Vahabi, 2009). During the Cold War, for example,
deterrence was a practical strategy developed through the application of conflict theory in
that it assumes that each state involved in a nuclear conflict ultimately wanted survival
over ideological victory (Vahabi, 2009). This required the combatants, not only to
coexist, but also to develop a mutual dependence upon each other’s continued existence
diplomatically, through information sharing, militarily, and economically (Vahabi, 2009).
The examination of social conflict, as found in the study of terrorism, suggests
that there exists a struggle conducted by a sub sect of a culture or nation that fights for a
common cause such as liberation, succession from the majority, or implementation of a
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religious or political ideology (Stringham, 2007). The understanding that, unlike a
market conflict – which is resolved within the boundaries of the rule of law – or a
national conflict – which is conducted under the guidance of international law and
established customs for national survival – the dynamic challenge of social or asymmetric
conflict should be examined through the lens of asymmetric conflict theory in order to
explain the use of violence (Stringham, 2007). As an extension of conflict theory, the
argument posed by Arreguin-Toft (2012) is that asymmetric conflict is rooted in conflict
theory, but requires a deeper inquiry into its causes and effects.
Arreguin-Toft (2012) asserts that, according to asymmetrical conflict theory,
when the strong engage the weak in asymmetric, armed conflict, a long-term strategy that
establishes an achievable goal becomes more important to achieving victory than
employing mere power. The use of the conflict in Afghanistan as the litmus test for
investigating the contemporary security strategies and counterterrorism policies to
determine if engaging in orthodox military approaches is, thus, a feasible approach to
countering the impact of terror. In this study, organizations that employ terror as means
for social and political change were examined. The literature demonstrates that, over the
last 16 years, there have been some short-term accomplishments using the “heavy hand”
and “high funding” approach of the third generation conventional military. However,
these successes usually came at the early stages of the conflict and were replaced by the
long-term strategy of the asymmetrical adversary (Banks, 2011).
The literature also establishes the premise that applying the asymmetrical conflict
theory (Toft, 2012) will help to explain that, as a struggle develops over a protracted
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period of time, early victories will be thwarted by the adversary who adapts asymmetric
methods, as demonstrated in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the specific adversary is a
collection of extremist, insurgent, and terrorist organizations that have endured
American-led coalition countermeasures, learned from them the American-led activities,
and responded with a more effective means of achieving chaos, creating terror, and
encouraging lawlessness (Bolechow, 2005). By enduring, waiting, and studying the
conventional adversary, a terrorist can mitigate counterterrorism strategies through
rapidly counteracting the static antiterrorism strategy. This was demonstrated in
Afghanistan with the rise of antidemocratic organizations that moved temporarily from
direct action against coalition forces to asymmetric actions, such as the controlling of the
media message for Al Qaeda and Taliban forces (Caldwell, 2011). Such a response from
an asymmetric adversary results in the absurd strategy of using manpower, technology,
and funding for minuscule outcomes at an increasing cost of treasure and blood compared
with the earlier accomplishments of the initial phases of the conflict (Caldwell, 2011).
This indicates the necessity for a close examination of the employment of the current
national strategies as an effectual process to neutralize an asymmetric adversary
(Hammes, 2005). There is a gap in the literature concerning this matter because
researchers have failed to expound upon how a dominant diplomatic, intellectual,
military, and economic power (such as the United States) might use a conventional
military strategy to defeat an asymmetrical adversary such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda
(Armborst, 2010).
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Nature of the Study
The intent of this study is to employ a qualitative research method, centered on a
narrative analysis approach that incorporates open-ended inquiries by using a semistructured cross-examination of the subjects as they detail their experiences and
conceptions of the issue. The narrative approach intertwines a sequence of events, taken
from individual experiences, and allows for a cohesive chronicle of the impact of
American strategy – both on the Afghan nationals affected by it and the American
personnel required to implement it. The narrative approach requires in-depth
examination of the participant’s experiences, along with supporting documents that lead
to the discovery of trends and themes that illustrate the individual’s life influences and
the strategy that created it (Creswell, 2013).
The current analysis required scrutiny of the information presented by the
participants, centered on their perspectives and experiences of the American security
strategy as it pertains to Afghanistan and the Central Asian States. The primary
researcher conducted this examination using a descriptive research survey design. This
research design was appropriate in that it allowed the researcher to exploit the qualitative
data provided by the participants. This design also made it possible for qualitative data to
be thoroughly examined through identification, analysis, and interpretation of various
conditions that are relevant to the policy guidelines (see Frankfort-Nachmias &
Nachmias, 2008).
The study was restricted to no more than ten participants total: five participants
were chosen at random from the Special Forces retired community and five Afghan
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national participants that lived under the American counterterrorism strategy were
interviewed. A consistent approach was employed; participants were administered the
questions in a uniform manner, while still allowing each subject to reply in as much detail
as they desired. This design was appropriate in that it allowed for comparison of the
current situation and the expected situation. The findings will be presented in the form of
a table. For this analysis, various instruments were used that supported an accurate
survey, such as NVivo as the means to capture and organize the data. Other survey
resources, including interviews and checklists, were used. Patton (2012) opines, “the use
of a various number of research instruments is always encouraged so as to ensure that the
data collected is accurate and holistic” (p.??). Opinions from subject matter experts were
pursued from the appropriate sources to ascertain the suitability of the research
instruments.
Definitions of Terms
Asymmetric warfare. The struggle in which two belligerents contrast in the size
and ability of their economic, military, and social capabilities, yet the weaker side
attempts to exploit the stronger foe’s weaknesses. The conflict relies upon the weaker
adversary employing strategies and tactics of unconventional or irregular warfare. In
this, the weaker adversary employs a strategy that offset deficiencies in quantity or
quality by neutralizing or making a weakness out the stronger foes reliance on
conventional power. Such strategies move beyond just being militarized and use all
elements of society where, in contrast, symmetric war is based on two adversaries that
employ similar conventional power and resources that rely on tactics that are at their core
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similar, differing only in specifics and implementation (Toft, 2012). Furthermore, a
broad and irregular spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations
conducted by states, organizations, or individuals as well as surrogate forces under their
control, specifically affecting vulnerabilities within an adversarial government or armed
force (Department of Defense, 2010).
Antiterrorism. Actions that are taken with the goal of decreasing the
vulnerability of people and property to terrorist actions, including the response to affected
areas and containment of areas by the military and civilian forces (Department of
Defense, 2010).
Center of gravity. The foundation of political, social, and military power that
handles moral standing, tangible strength in a conventional conflict, freedom of action to
respond to social threat, and provides the will to act (JP 1-02 & JP 5-0, Aug 2011).
Effects-based operations. The method used by military or operational planners
for attaining chosen strategic goals, outcome, or effect on the enemy (JFCOM Glossary at
www.jfcom .mil/about/glossary.htm).
Irregular warfare. A form of asymmetric warfare that describes an armed
conflict between governing state authorities and non-state actors for legitimate
governance as well as social influence over the targeted population(s). Employers of
irregular warfare use indirect or asymmetric approaches in challenging the stronger more
capable conventional state forces through a full range of military and other capabilities.
The goal of the irregular warrior is to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and
willpower to continue (DOD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, Dec 2008).
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Insurgency. A methodical and systematic operation, the goal of which is to
overthrow a constituted government through the use of asymmetric tactics that employ
certain elements, such as subversion and indirect armed conflict (Department of Defense,
2010).
Jihad. An Arabic word originally meaning: to struggle, endeavor, or apply
oneself in support of Allah. The term has become associated with violent extremists who
employ the perception of jihad as a call to arms to justify their actions (Department of
Defense, 2010).
Measures of effectiveness. The metric established by operational leaders to
judge the success or effectiveness of a particular strategy, operational implementation, or
tempo and assess the area or country’s system behavior for positive changes as well as
indicators in the capabilities of adversaries and the operational environment in which
forces are deployed within. The purpose of the gauging the measures of effectiveness is
to create a form of measuring the attainment of the strategic goal (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0,
Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011).
National strategy. The guiding stratagem or blueprint for improving and using
the social, moral, economic, diplomatic, and informational resources of a nation that form
a synergy with the tangible assets of military might to secure national objectives (JP 102).
National Defense Strategy. The National Defense Strategy is a proposal
submitted by the Secretary of Defense for the employment of the Armed Forces of the
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United States, as well as agencies and organizations, to achieve national security strategy
objectives (DOD Joint Publication 1-02, June 2014).
Strategy. A plan, policy or approach to solving a problem in the case of a nation
by using the mechanisms that make up the nation’s power. The strategy involves using
the nation’s resources in a synchronized fashion that is integrated with governmental
agencies’ critical infrastructure and key partners to achieve national and multinational
objectives (DOD Joint Publication1-02, June 2014 and DOD Joint Publication 3-0, Joint
Operations, 11 Aug 2011).
Terrorism. The illegitimate use of violence or the threat of the illegitimate use of
violence that’s purpose is to sow fear as well as to coerce a legitimate government or
established society to accept particular political goals. Terrorism is often inspired by or
used in the name of religious, political, or other ideological dogmas that are the center of
an illegitimate organization’s moral foundation. Such organizations are, though inspired
by religious or other ideologies, committed to the pursuit of goals that are usually
political objectives (DOD Joint Publication 3-26, 2014). The premeditated actions based
on politically motivated actions that create violence intend to be enacted against civilian
or noncombatant targets by an organization that is considered to be a subnational group
or illegal agent as quantified by the United States Federal Code 22 USC §2656f as well as
defined within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Department of Justice,
2014). Terrorism may also be defined as the illegitimate use of violence against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce the legitimate government, the civilian population, or
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (Department of
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Homeland Security, 2013). This definition is used by the FBI and indicates that the
mission of the FBI Counterterrorism organization is to identify a terrorist incident as it
pertains to the criminal laws of the United States, which would result in the suspected
terrorist being subject to arrest and prosecution (Department of Justice, 2013).
Terrorist. An individual that engages in an act or acts of terrorism. (Department
of Defense, 2014). Also, a subgroup, by definition, is an extremist who uses terrorism for
the purpose of targeting of noncombatant or innocent people to produce fear in order to
terrorize regimes or societies in the quest of political, religious, or ideological goals.
Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic
prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system, and the future of
civil society (Department of Defense, 2014).
Terrorist organization. More than one terrorist who works in unison towards a
common goal, usually under an organizational framework, with an establish hierarchy
and position requirements. The assembly of terrorists into a group makes this
organization a united relationship that uses its organization for the purpose of
perpetrating acts of terrorism (Department of Defense, 2014).
Assumptions
A key assumption held in this inquiry was that narratives from the participants
would be provided honestly and candidly. Based upon rigorous critique by a preliminary
test of the questions and the instrument used to measure the responses, it was assumed
that the data gained was identified with a high confidence rate. Further, it was assumed
that participants in the inquiry would complete the interview process and have the
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information measured through the approved instrument based on the criteria established
for the investigation.
Scope and Delimitations
The intent of this study was to employ a qualitative research method, centered
upon a narrative methodology, that incorporated open-ended inquiries by using a semistructured cross-examination of the subjects as they detailed their experiences and
conceptions of the issue based in their experiences (see Creswell, 2013). In this analysis,
the information provided by the participants was scrutinized for their perspectives of and
experiences with the American national security strategy. This analysis provides a view
of each individual’s story as the foundation for the larger influences created by
counterterrorism national strategy as it pertains to Afghanistan. It was restricted to no
more than 10 participants, with one group of the participants selected from the Special
Operations retired community. These individuals have experience conducting operations
to implement American strategy in Afghanistan. The second group of participants
consisted of Afghan citizens with experience with American security policies and
counterterrorism operations. A consistent approach with the participants in this study
was used through the administration of questions in an undeviating method, which
allowed each participant to reply in as much detail as they desired to reflect their
perceptions based on life experiences with the strategy.
This study was based on the acceptance that any security strategy ought to
recognize the impact of a modern asymmetric war and must correspondingly assimilate
the doctrines of traditional strategists with the evolving methods of asymmetrical warfare.
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It is impractical to apply a direct study of the United States’ mastery of the nature of all
versions of modern war, but what can be examined is the impact of a strategist in better
understanding the limitations of its conventional approach to strategic contemplation
(Boot, 2016). State and non-state adversaries that have abundant weapons, technology,
or a resilient economy do not employ asymmetric conflict, but the victor of the conflict is
the adversary that survives, adapts, and maintains their willpower by controlling the
tempo and maintaining a resolve to win (Thorton, 2007). With this in mind, the
examination of data in this study was limited to American national security policies as
they pertain to the conflict in Afghanistan. Moreover, the study was restricted to the
impact of the strategy on the local level of implementers and receivers of both the
American and the asymmetric adversary activities as the strategy and counterstrategy
activities took place. The results of this study add to the literature by focusing on the
examination of security strategy, as opposed to an asymmetric adversary, by investigating
the topic through the lens of a narrative experience. This examination also delineates the
study by focusing it on the experiences of the individuals that lived through the effects of
the strategy against the literature.
Limitations
One of the advantages of narrative-based research is that participants are allowed
to weave a sequence of events that provide a storyline for their experiences, a timeline,
and the size of the interview pool of participants is small – usually one to two individuals
(Creswell, 2013). As such, misinterpretation or bias in the findings might be in question.
The characteristics and size of the target population of this study bring a level of restraint
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to the possibility of bias. The participants were drawn from professional communities in
which objectivity is highly prized and expected. Therefore, it was assumed that they
would be objective in replying to queries about strategy in developing security and
counterterrorism strategies as it relates to asymmetrical warfare.
The participants shared their mutual experience of security strategies and
counterterrorism operations with a focus concentrated on operations within Afghanistan.
Through the demands of their profession, the participants exhibit superb expertise in the
field of security strategies and counterterrorism policies, yet restraint was exercised in
determining a conclusion from the data or agreeing to the findings of the data that was
validation for a particular policy interpretation. One potential weakness of the study
might be the participants’ unwillingness to indicate any possible likelihood of failed
behavior, especially if they perceived that their behavior was a direct reflection of the
strategic policies they were implementing or received on a tactical level in Afghanistan.
Through the confidentiality of the program and anonymity of the research design, this
concern was mitigated.
Due to the potential effort, access, and time constraints that were faced in the
course of this study, the participant pool was limited solely to professionals with
knowledge of security strategy implementation and experience in counterterrorism
operations with a focus on operational experience within Afghanistan. Applying the
narrative methodology of qualitative research, the research had a small sample size to
draw from; as such, the broad-spectrum of the data might be in question (Creswell,
2013). The very characteristics of the participant population convey a degree of
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limitation. The convictions of the participants’ viewpoints based on political ideology
were also avoided so as to avoid bias in endorsing or judging a specific course of action
as opposed to another. It was ensured that the views or perceptions stated by a
participant would not be used to construe, support, or reflect the senior leadership in
leading the implementation of strategy and counterterrorism policy.
Significance
The intent of this study was to employ a qualitative research method,
centered on a narrative analysis approach that incorporated open-ended inquiries by
using a semi-structured cross-examination of subjects as they detailed their
experiences and conception of the issue at hand. The narrative approach intertwines
a sequence of events that is usually taken from a number of individuals in order to
form a cohesive chronicle of impact of American strategy (Creswell, 2013). The
narrative approach requires in-depth interviews, supported by the examination of
supporting documents that leads to the discovery of trends and themes that illustrate
the individual’s life influences and the strategy that created them (Creswell, 2013).
In this analysis, the information presented by the participants was scrutinized,
with a focus on their perspectives and experiences of the American security strategy as it
pertained to Afghanistan and the Central Asian States. This examination was
accomplished using a descriptive research survey design. This research design was
appropriate because it allowed exploitation of the qualitative data provided by the
participants. This design also make it possible for the research to exploit qualitative data
through identification, analysis, and interpretation of various conditions that are relevant
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to the policy guidelines (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Restricted to retired
Special Forces soldiers that conducted operations to implement national strategy in
Afghanistan as well as participants from the Afghan community that endured the actions,
this methodological strategy provided a unique way to examine the means that the United
States military uses to recognize the type of war it is engaged in. The uniform manner in
which the interviews were conducted provided a measured control over the data, yet
allowed each contributor to reply in as much detail as they desired. The primary
researcher used various instruments in the analysis, such as NVivo, that supported an
accurate survey as the means to capture and organize the data. Survey resources used
included interviews and checklist (see Patton, 2012).
Summary
The impact of the current asymmetric warfare environment consists of multiple
actors and organizations across the globe supporting each other only through their mutual
goals (Robinson et al., 2014). The issue with asymmetric conflict is that, even though it
is not as obvious as a massive conventional military attack, it does impact the nation’s
interest. This impact is compounded by the challenges to national strategy response to
economic globalization that creates interdependence between nation states, as well as
population groups that in turn create social competition between these same entities
(Kunstler, 2011). The rapid growth of interdependence between previously isolated
entities is compounded by the infusion of asymmetric activities conducted by non-nation
state actors (such as transnational terrorists, insurgents, and international criminal
organizations) who serve to complicate matters of strategy and policy (Robinson, 2014).

25
The overlap of these groups becomes problematic, as globalization normally generates a
shift in the previously established balance of power. The era of globalization is notable
because of the incredible scope and pace of the changes occurring both outside of and
within existing power structures (Thomas, 2011). As it relates to the asymmetric
adversary, the shift in the balance of power, along with the need to stabilize the areas that
threaten globalization, requires intervention to provide stability that results in successful
U.S. military and political operations (Choi, 2015). These operations, based on the Cold
War strategy of proxy war, rely on the support and contribution of the host government in
the country that requires stabilization (Choi, 2015).
The intensity of these operations depends on their objectives, goals, and the types
of organization – some of which receive either direct support from the target population
or apathy from the population in supporting the national government goals (Amir &
Singer, 2008). Due to the global nature of asymmetric threats in creating multiple ongoing conflicts, this study focuses on the most prevalent example of U.S. National
Security Strategy in addressing the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan. Thus, this study
addresses, in particular, the strategy of the U.S. military during the Afghanistan conflict
as an example of the development and execution of a national security strategy (see
Breen & Geltzer, 2011). Additionally, organizations using terror tactics employed
around the world were examined to demonstrate the global nature of asymmetric warfare
and serve as the basis for explanation. Understanding the type of conflict, as it explains
the prevalent threats, will allow strategy developers and conflict analysts to adapt their
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approach in addressing the core of the conflict instead of a piecemeal response to the
tactics of an adversary (Mack, 1975).
When the United States declared the “War on Terrorism,” it led to military
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as numerous smaller engagements around
the globe. Preble’s (2016) question, “Has the United States botched the timeless warning
of past experiences to know your enemy and design a strategy that destroys him?” (p.??)
requires examination. This inquiry into military strategy may provide an explanation as to
what the United States has achieved in Afghanistan and, more singularly, whether the
United States has successfully targeted terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. This gap
in the research led the researcher to examine terrorism research that included the broader
impact of being part of an asymmetric conflict in which the adversary for the nation state,
chiefly the United States, cannot compete on a symmetric level and, thus, engages the
communities from which terrorists often emerge as well as the populaces that convey the
impact of counterterrorism strategies.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
There are many opinions on war and the development of strategy to conduct war
(Gray, 2006). One argument posed by a number of professionals and scholars anticipates
a global revolution in military affairs brought on by the application of advanced
technologies and an innovative doctrine that predominantly advances the areas of
information management, remote surveillance, and precision airstrike capabilities based
on advanced sensors to the operator networks. This would result in a speed of execution
for military operations that is beyond all but the most advanced societies’ capabilities
(Chew, 2014). At the other end of the argument, there are those that propose that the
dominant social trends, particularly ethnic conflict, population and resource imbalances,
as well as the urbanization of population centers, combined with a general appreciation of
Western military superiority, propel warfare toward terrorist organizations, criminals, and
revolutionary insurgencies that employ brutal local conflicts (Gentile, 2013).
Regrettably, a large number of professionals and scholars are advocates for a single view
of warfare by transforming strategy as if one of these futures automatically excludes the
other, yet the literature demonstrates that nothing could be further from the truth (U.S.
Senate, 2014).
Literature Search Strategy
Investigating a subject that is as broad reaching as terrorism as well as the use of
asymmetric conflict in terrorism requires the evaluation of numerous peer-reviewed and
professionally sustained informational sources. These sources are required to be
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grounded by information provided from or referenced for official diplomatic instructions,
national security policies, accounts of military campaigns, and activities that document
government agencies responsible for countering terrorism such as the Department of
Homeland Security and the Justice Department. The Walden University Library and
Research Center provided the primary researcher with the material used in this project
through access to scholarly databases. What follows is a review of those key texts.
The Library of Congress maintains a register and valuation of numerous databases
that are pertinent to the research of government policies, operations, and results as they
relate to terrorism (The Library of Congress, 2017). The core of these available
databases is the “Social Science Research on Terrorism,” which provides detailed
accounts of operations related to terrorist response – including cost, time, and measurable
results. A key feature of the Library of Congress is the portal access to numerous
Internet-based databases that are relevant in research based on the social science view of
terrorism, specifically for those searching for actual data (e.g., names of terrorist
organizations, incidents of terrorist activity, and those with search capabilities). The
databases accessed during the course of this study were maintained primarily by U.S.
government agencies, government-sponsored research centers, and international
organizations.
The Department of Justice operates the National Institute for Justice (NIJ), which
maintains a database on terrorist incidents and indictments in the American Terrorism
Study (National Institute for Justice, 2017). Working closely with the FBI, the NIJ has
collected information on incidents and indictments from terrorism investigations. The
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dataset includes material on 500 terrorists and over 60 terrorist groups indicted in more
than 6,700 federal criminal counts. NIJ has supported the data collection and analysis
portion of the research, a portion of which has compared international jihad groups with
domestic right-wing groups and showed attempts by domestic terrorists to forge alliances
with international jihadist groups.
The Rand Corporation is a major think tank for the United States and maintains a
database titled the “Rand Database Worldwide Terrorism Incidents” (RDWTI), which is
a compilation of data from global sources on international and domestic terrorist events
ranging from 1968 through 2009 (The Rand Corporation, 2017). Contributions from
public and private organizations sponsor the maintenance of the RDWTI and its
predecessors, the RAND Terrorism Chronology and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident
Database. The RDWTI is a fully searchable and interactive database, with the intention
of providing quality and comprehensive data for researcher on a scholarly level.
The National Archives is a publically administered repository of all records of the
United States (National Archives, 2017). To accomplish the monumental task of keeping
track of these records, the National Archive maintains the Archives Library Information
Center, organized to provide access to information on American historical government,
archival administration, and information management documents. There is many diverse
datasets employed by the library information center, but the two key areas used in this
investigation were: the Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool (CREST) and
the Digital National Security Archive. The CREST database contains unclassified
documents from the CIA Directorate of Operations reports on the role of intelligence in
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the post-WWII period to 2010 and is an excellent source of informaiton concerning the
activities of the United States military in Afghanistan post-9/11. The Digital National
Security Archive contains 38 collections consisting of over 94,000 declassified
government documents that incorporate global events and U.S. policy decisions.
Theoretical Foundation
Of all the contemporary justifications for waging war, it is arguably certain that
asymmetric is amongst the broadest, if not the most encompassing. Some scholars state
that asymmetrical conflict theory can be categorized through the examination of various
existing and potential concepts of asymmetric conflict (Chase, 2011). Employing
asymmetrical conflict theory, scholars characterize four different subthemes through
which asymmetry may be deduced as it applies to strategy: “power distribution,
organizational capability of the adversary, approach to conflict, and cultural norms of the
environment that the conflict is waged within” (p.123). This recent approach in defining
conflict can result in a misunderstanding through the misapplication of the terms
asymmetry strategy and/or asymmetric conflict, which distorts the adversary and leads us
to make major strategic blunders (Angstrom, 2011). This is demonstrated in the strategy
of concentrating on threats rather than adversarial strategies. By employing the
asymmetric conflict theory over conflict theory, this study allows the strategy for
Afghanistan to be understood through the strategic nature, goals, and overall concepts of
American strategy in Afghanistan as judged by the operations the strategy dictates (see
Peceny & Bosin, 2011).
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In describing asymmetric war, researchers of current forms of conflict theorize
that significant change in the character of war has occurred in which America, the
champion of symmetric war, has not addressed (Chew, 2014). Many of these studies
have identified and analyzed the characteristics of modern interventions as the template
for asymmetric war (Chace, 2011). Proponents of asymmetric warfare have suggested
that there are significant differences between modern (asymmetric) war and conventional
wars of the past (Chace, 2011). The challenge for strategists in approaching a modern
asymmetric conflict is that war, as cognitively acknowledged to most people that are
noncombatants, is a battle in which soldiers and machines meet to decide who wins,
much like a football game. The expectation is that, with war, there is a substantial event
– such as one battle or campaign – that decides the issues through a dispute in
international affairs (Chace, 2011). September 11th, 2001 could be considered the day
that conventional war as a mainstay of strategy ended with the need for strategy in its
Clausewitzian tradition to recede (Chace, 2011). Asymmetric warfare theorists identify
this type of warfare with particular styles of conducting war – in contrast to the
conventional style of post-Cold War United States strategies that focus on maneuver
warfare. Asymmetric warfare, to the contrary, employs all available systems ranging
from political, economic, social, to finally, a military solution in order to convince the
enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too
costly for the perceived benefit (Hammes, 2005). In essence, warfare, particularly that
seen in Afghanistan, has evolved into a form of global insurgency against conventional
powers (Hammes, 2005).
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The one linking factor that is examined between symmetric, or conventional, war
and an asymmetric one is that strategy is essential for success. The core of conflict,
whether it is symmetric or asymmetric, is the persistent threat or use of violence to
achieve desired ends (CITE). With this in mind, strategy has no permanent form and
must always manifest itself to meet the challenges in order to achieve the objective. This
perspective is best summed up by Dolman: “strategy, in its simplest form, is a plan for
attaining continuing advantage (Chace, 2011, p.??). Dolman discerns that a strategist’s
duty is frequently supported by an advantage that allows for the strategy to be successful.
Yet, with an asymmetric adversary, this advantage can easily become a disadvantage
(Angstrom, 2011). The strategist must observe that an advantage may take the form of
material, political will, or a superior understanding of how to convert resources to
achieve its ends. Understanding asymmetrical war and all the influences it has on the
multidisciplinary aspects of modern conflict is a challenge for strategists that must
manifest itself in a similarly wide range.
The uninformed use of strategy may employ an absolute means for achieving an
objective. However, in the 21st century, the achievement of Dolman’s continuing
advantage needs to be reexamined as a strategy that reminds us that warfare, and a
successful strategy, is generational. The current generation exploits asymmetric war for
the purposes of successfully reaching their political goals (Angstrom, 2011). In
asymmetric warfare, the strategic environment is characterized by a rich set of global
political, economic, military, and social/cultural variables that form the basis for global
influence, played out in an increasingly connected and contested information domain
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(Carter, 2014). The resultant meta-trends exert extremely powerful, complex, and
somewhat unpredictable forces on the global environment (Carter, 2014). The leading
factor in the global environment is the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which
outlines the focus of the power and direction of the military strategies of the United
States and illuminates what challenges and threats the nation faces (Sanger & Baker,
2010). Table 1 identifies the focus of the national strategy since 1994 and demonstrates
the changing factors and focus of the strategy. Though terrorism is identified and interest
in the security of U.S. citizens is made clear, the identification of asymmetric threats is
not currently acknowledged, nor is the world prepared for them (Robinson, 2014).
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Table 1
Two Decades of National Security Strategies
1994 -NSS
• Enlarging the community
of democracies
• Enhance our security
• Promote prosperity at
home
• Promote democracy

1997 -NSS
• Protect nation's essential
and enduring requirements
• Safeguard the lives and
safety of Americans
• Maintain the sovereignty
of America, with the
nation’s values, institutions
and territory intact
• Provide for the prosperity
of the nation and its people

1999/2000 -NSS
• Defend vital interests of
the nation
• Ensure the survival,
safety and vitality of nation
• Support the national
interests through
humanitarian and other
interests.

2002 - NSS
• Defend the nation
• Preserve the peace by
building on common
interests to promote global
security
• Extend the benefits of
freedom across the globe

2006 - NSS
• Champion the goals of
human dignity
• Strengthen the global
alliances to defeat global
terrorism
• Work with the nations
allies to resolve conflicts
• Avert our adversaries
from threatening America
or its allies, with WMD
• Incite a new age of global
economic growth
• Expand the development
of allied nations by
opening societies and
constructing the
infrastructure of
democracy
• Modernize America's
national security
establishments
• Take on the prospects as
well as confront the
challenges that
globalization of the
economy, cultures, and
information create.

2010 NSS
• Strengthen Nation’s
Defense
• Secure the Homeland and
Combat the Threat of
Terrorism
• Construct the Capacity to
Prevent Conflict
• Avert the Increase and
Employment of Weapons
of Mass Destruction
• Assure Access to Shared
Spaces
• Confront Climate Change
•Protect the areas of Cybersecurity, Space Security,
Air and Maritime Security
• Increase the focus on
Global Health Security
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Conceptual Framework
Within the last fourteen years, the United States has shifted to employing a
strategy of population-centric counterinsurgency strategies such as were used in
Afghanistan and Iraq – with inadequate results. Though the countries of Afghanistan and
Iraq are different in culture and infrastructure, both U.S. military campaigns against them
sought to secure the population and build local support for the new governments (Preble,
Ashford, & Evans, 2016). The results were conflicts that were exceedingly costly in
terms of blood and treasure, while neither yielded a definitive accomplishment of the
national objectives. What has become typical in asymmetric conflicts is that the conflict
generates international and domestic political, military, and public aversion to largescale, United States-led operations. Consequently, many U.S. citizens continue to
question the efficacy of America’s counterinsurgency strategy. Following the operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is the question as to whether the United States can and will
develop a national strategy that will prevail over asymmetric threats to its security
(Hammes, 2012).
Previous Approaches to the Challenges of Asymmetric Warfare
Academics and military professionals have attributed the complications in the
military operations that resulted from the September 11, 2001 attack to be a case of
myopia, of fighting an irregular or asymmetric war (Thomas, 2011). The effects of the
Vietnam War deeply ingrained in the U.S. military psyche, and overwhelming success
that the 1990/91 Gulf War produced, the view became that, rather than make better
preparations for asymmetric war, it was best to avoid potential quagmires and to consign
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in the operations doctrine the concept of “Operations Other Than War”(Thomas, 2011).
Wariness to engage in an asymmetric conflict creates a reluctance, also, to develop a
strategy along with supporting programs to comprehend and successfully prosecute them
(Sobek & Braithwaite, 2005). Ricks (2012) describes the reasons for the lack of a viable
asymmetric doctrine, let alone a strategy, as a post-Vietnam, military-produced trend.
Excellent battalion-level commanders that were once promoted to flag rank were not
prepared for the changing demands of the post-Soviet era yet were expected to make
decisions at the strategic level concerning asymmetric operations (Ricks, 2012).
When strategy is debated in the academic environment, whether a course of action
is a tactical perspective versus a strategic one is an academic exercise. However, when
applied to a real conflict, the choice of developing a tactical level strategy instead of
developing a national strategic level becomes precarious in the development of
methodologies that a strategy produces (Hoover Institute, 2015). This is observed in
tactical strategies based on clever moves with the goal of achieving surprise over a fixed
enemy. This element of surprise becomes the focal point instead of a national strategy
that outlines the goal to achieve a sustained victory (Ricks, 2012). The goal of a
successful strategy is based on a desired long-term political outcome achieved over a
temporary military one (Ikenberry, Slaughter, & Slaughter, 2010). It is argued that, in
Afghanistan, military strategy devolved into numerous strategies for a desirable political
and military outcome (which was not reached) and thus failure transpired (Livingston &
O’Harlan, 2014).
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Challenges of Asymmetric Warfare and National Security Strategy
The literature on the study of terrorism demonstrates that terror is a tool utilized in
asymmetric warfare (Banks, 2011). This suggests the argument that a different strategy
in countering the asymmetric adversary is required, as opposed to the separate and standalone counterterrorism policy (in which there has not been enough research conducted in
examining the asymmetrical method of war as part of the national security strategy)
(Erye, 2010). War has been deemed by both scholars and professionals as a struggle
where either a nation-state or a non-state actor will arm, plan, or strategize differently
from the other based on resources, culture and (most importantly) the goals that are
formed when entering a conflict (Paulus, 2009). Asymmetric warfare is also recognized
on the tactical level; it requires a particular kind of strategy and has been described as
“Irregular Warfare” in many military doctrines (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014). Within the
purview of military field commanders, asymmetric or irregular warfare is described as a
type of military dispute where one side makes the attempt to exploit the characteristics of
the other by challenging the ability to provide security and stability (Gentile, 2013 &
DOD, 2010).
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the resulting war in Afghanistan are the bestrecognized recent models of asymmetric warfare in which a weaker foe attacks by outmaneuvering a stronger force through the employment of tactics and methods unforeseen
by that stronger foe (DiPaulo, 2005). A number of professionals and scholars describe
asymmetric war as significant and insignificant clashes among nations or groups that
have dissimilar military, economic, and political stratagems and capabilities. Since the
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reemergence of Afghanistan as the focal point in the counter-terrorism policies of the
United States and is held as an example of that national strategy, new research into
cultural, economic, military and political responses to terrorism, counterinsurgency, and
other methods of asymmetric warfare have been conducted (Paulus, 2009).
The Gap in the Literature
Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 there has been a rapid
outgrowth in the field of terrorism-based research resulting from the substantial increase
in funding for terrorism-related research and education programs. Prior to the 9/11
attacks, the field of terrorism research was predominately based on historical accounts as
they relate to political struggle. Traditionally, the benchmark case is that of the 1972
Munich Olympic attack and these types of attacks culminated in Al Qaida-centered
attacks against U.S. assets at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the American Embassy
in Kenya during the 1990s (Stampnitzky, 2013). Following the 9/11 attacks, the field
rapidly grew from a minor field of study within security or political studies into a
significant field of study that has generated its own journals, centers of research with
prominent scholars and experts leading the movement for research funding projects,
conferences and degree based programs. The significance of this rapid rise in the study
of terrorism is the lack of a cohesive interpretation as to what terrorism actually is, how is
it caused, and whether it is a political, martial or social science (Ranstorp, 2009). Though
there have been many critics as to the viewpoint of what generates qualified studies in the
field of terrorism, there is a consensus that the field does not generate enough fieldwork
such as is provided by a narrative study in which life experiences that incorporate
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terrorism are investigated. It is probable that the growing sense of unease found in recent
scholarly studies about the development of asymmetric warfare has resulted from
concerns about the global war on terror (WOT) (Ranstorp, 2009).
Since 2001, a great deal of funding has been put forth to fund research in the field
of terrorism studies; this has resulted in the expansion of the field and created new
scholars and professionals. Yet, we are no closer to answering the question, “What
strategy should a nation employee to defeat terrorism?” The consequential
unproductivity of focusing on a success strategy in regard to this topic is partially due to
the United States government’s approach of providing funding for research without
providing the essential information concerning national objectives within academia
(Sageman, 2014). This creates the gap between academia, professional environments,
and the national security community. This, in turn, leads to suppositions about what
terrorism actually is and how to defeat it – with little empirical grounding in academia as
well as in professional environments (Sageman, 2014). A possible resolution for this
unproductivity is to collect nonsensitive data and compare this data to the examination of
the people that enforce national security strategy as well as those that receive the results
of the strategy.
Roots of the Afghanistan Strategy
In defining terrorism and the overlapping of terrorist studies with insurgency, the
current discourse has shifted focus – from one of initial nation state internal conflict
erupting past borders to one resulting in criminal activity that is classified as terrorism
since the perpetrators have the goal of supporting political, religious or social objectives
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of their cause as opposed to criminal gain (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 46). This shift caused
experts to focus their arguments away from counterinsurgency and toward redefining
terrorism as a main element of social conflict. The result was a definition of terror that
includes the obscurities of politics, morality and rationality as three motivators for a
terrorist (Lampnitzky, 2013). Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the field of terrorism studies was
disjointed and, admittedly, a relatively new field for social science that can trace its roots
to the study of insurgent of guerilla warfare based on the activities of post-World War
conflicts. The “War on Terror,” with the subsequent engagement in Afghanistan,
resulted in competing definitions of “terror” – between organizations tasked with
countering terrorism and policymakers, who do not seem to see the difference between an
insurgent and a terrorist, as a consequence of the strategy of the United States during the
conflict (Wainscott, 2015).
This strategy, using the conflicting definition for terrorism, would steer the
operations in Afghanistan by employing previous counterinsurgency and terrorism
studies from the post-Vietnam period to present day (Wilson, 2007). The connections
between counter insurgency and terrorism, when used as methods to develop strategies
when engaging in asymmetric warfare, are based on two factors proposed by Horne
(2006) in that the techniques and goals to wage war by the groups are similar. Thus the
belief that an insurgency and terrorism are compatible allows for a singular strategy that
combats both threats.
The core to the development of the strategy is supported by two studies conducted
by Galula (1964) and Trinquer (2006) that are based on their experiences in the Algerian
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liberation war from France. Both Galula and Trinquer ground their views on experiences
gained from combating an insurgency based on a faction that grew from the local
population of Algeria. These early counterinsurgent experts provide two unique views on
the requirements of developing a strategy against an asymmetric adversary that prevails
in many academic and professional communities today.
Galula (1964) presents the argument that a military solution to countering an
insurgency is counterproductive in that it ultimately alienates the host population that
both the insurgency and counter insurgency depend upon for survival and success.
Basically, it is Galula that provides the strategy (employed by the American Surge in
Afghanistan): that a successful counterinsurgency program is based on a “Clear-HoldBuild” strategy that is the cornerstone in U.S. and Coalition activities (Petraeus, 2013).
The goal of this strategy is to deny the insurgency a base to operate and to convince the
local population that the established government is a stronger and better option for them
over the insurgents (Weisiger, 2014). This philosophy has become a foundation of the
2013 published DOD Counterinsurgency manual as well as the American operational
goal in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 (Cordesman, 2015). Thus, the basic idea that
success is dependent upon popular support requires the tactic of clearing a population
base of insurgent activity, holding the base in order to prevent the insurgency from
reentering, and building a physical, security, economic and political infrastructure that
once successful in an area can be replicated in ever growing large spheres of influence
(Wilson, 2012).
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Countering the view that asymmetric war is a competition for popular support is
Trinquer (1964), who presents the argument that asymmetric war is not a battle for the
popular support, but a battle to destroy the insurgent and the insurgent’s political power.
Trinquer argues that terrorism and insurgency are directly linked. He observes that
insurgency spills beyond the borders of any nation or state and employs the techniques of
terror through an increasing cycle of violence in order to obtain its goals (Trinquer,
1964). It is Trinquer, using experiences as a French officer serving in Algeria following
service in Indochina, who points out that the population is but one aspect of the conflict;
the center of gravity for modern war (asymmetric war), however, is the ability of the
adversary to propagate the capacity to wage war. Thus, Trinquer argues that a security
strategy should be centered on destroying the adversary’s ability to wage war, including
eliminating the enemy’s military, political or cultural organizations (Thornton, 2007). A
further aspect of Trinquer’s philosophy concerning asymmetric strategy (adopted by the
United States government for a short period of time) is the employment of torture as a
means to counter the fear created by terrorism (Burke, 2008). Trinquer demonstrates that
the actions of the French during the struggle for Algerian independence in the 1950’s
were very effective at crushing an insurgency that depends upon local popular support for
all of its need. However, the techniques and tactics that allow the tactical victory were
also the catalyst for strategic defeat by the global population, which withdrew support for
the French forces in Algeria. The result was that France granted Algeria independence,
ultimately proving that winning battles alone will not guarantee success (Lee, 2006).
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The difference between the professional and academic camps about asymmetric
strategy can be found in the differences between Galula’s and Trinquer’s theories. This
can be summed up in the differences between defining the type of struggle that they faced
in Algeria. Galula express that a counterinsurgency/counter terrorism strategy is a
political, and ultimately a legal, issue between the government and the adversary; the
solution is the use of law and order to create stability (Galula, 1964). Trinquer, on the
other hand, contends that counterinsurgency/counterterrorism requires a new use of
military capabilities to defeat the enemy (Wilson, 2012). This lack of clear definition of
what the struggle is has created the effect of a war with no clear strategy for victory – or a
clear vision of what success is and how will it be measured. This lack of clarity in a
measurable strategy will ultimately lead to an insurgency or terrorist victory, as the larger
more powerful nation state loses popular support through fatigue of constantly struggling
against an elusive enemy that continues to survive (Sullivan, 2007).
Defining Asymmetric War
Many definitions exist for asymmetric warfare. A more general definition is: a
dominion in which military activities that dictate that national security asymmetry is the
operating, establishing, and contemplating strategy differently than the opponent in order
to exploit advantages through the use of an opponent's weaknesses (Department of
Defense, 2010). The goal of this method is to gain the initiative that generates a greater
freedom of action. It can be a political strategy, military strategy, information-cultural
strategy or a combination of all. It contains dissimilar methods, skills, principles,
establishments, time, or a combination of any of these (Porter, 2006). Asymmetric
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warfare can be a short-term or long-term struggle; it may be contained within a single
country or span across a region – and even the globe (Cordesman, 2012). The issue with
asymmetric warfare is that it can be instituted as a grand strategy or used as a tactical
means that allows a singular method for a discrete struggle; or, it can be practiced in
conjunction with symmetric approaches that will have psychological and physical
aspects. The United States military has employed asymmetric activities on a tactical
level as prescribed by the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN)
manuals. These are actions that assist in mitigating negative impacts of operating in an
asymmetric environment in which the United States military has shifted from a
conventional force, capable of meeting and defeating a symmetric foe such as the former
Soviet Union, to one in which small unit commanders are assigned to areas and regions
within a combat zone (DOD, 2010). Yet, the strategy that placed these small units in an
asymmetric war has yet to address the goals or the desired end-state for the conflict
(Cordesman, 2012).
Defining a Strategy for Afghanistan
During an interview with Colin Powell concerning the U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan, his response to the strategy employed was: "You can say, 'Go take that hill,'
or, 'Take out the Taliban,' at the moment, but if your goal is to create a functioning
democracy, is that the role that a military operation will achieve?" (National Geographic,
2016). This concept is found in the challenge of developing a national strategy that meets
the national objectives, yet is achievable with the resources and culture it has to work
with. Not only is there challenge in working the Afghanistan culture but also dealing
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with the subcultures of the diplomatic, intellectual, military and economic domains that
exist in the United States (Biddle, 2008). When addressing an asymmetric war, tacticians
within those domains of the U.S. will argue that no country is more asymmetric in
warfare than the United States. Historically, the United States military has valued
adaptability in warfare strategies – from George Washington’s changing the Continental
Army’s training doctrine at Valley Forge to the Shock and Awe campaign in the opening
hours of the Iraqi Freedom Campaign (Gray, 2005). A key factor in the current version
of American adaptability in war has been its growing reliance on employing technology,
especially standoff technology to project its power. This is based on the assumption that
reducing American causalities, while increasing hostile casualties with overwhelming
force, will result in a short, relatively bloodless war. This is supported by agreement
between strategists in academic and military domains that, once an adversary’s military
infrastructure is defeated, a stable political and social infrastructure will follow
(Linnemann, 2016). Regrettably, the reliance on this predilection as basis for a national
strategy has repeatedly directed the nation into making a strategic overreach in
accomplishing objectives with a result in an unbalanced force structure, which ultimately
results in costing the nation much in blood and treasure as well as a loss of faith in the
national leadership (Crane, 2013).
In 2014, the United States national budget for defense was over $610 billion – an
amount the eclipses the next seven countries combined (Peter G. Peterson Foundation,
2015). The result is a nation that becomes more enamored with the advantages of
technology and in the United States creating a disparity in conventional military spending
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for high dollar technology to human based, asymmetric programs. Regional adversaries
find themselves unequal to matching, let alone defeating, the United States in terms of
military power. This, in turn, creates a modern version of a David and Goliath situation
in which the regional adversaries take on the role of David. As long as conventional
inequalities exist, it is to be expected that less powerful adversaries will employ the
“weapons of asymmetric warfare such as terrorism and insurgency” (Cordona, 2015).
Understanding Afghanistan and Terrorist Organizations
The core to all strategy development is to understand the adversary as it pertains
to asymmetric warfare and to understand the target population that the adversary depends
upon (Tarzi, 2005). Ahmad Shah Durran unified the Pashtuns tribes in 1747, in effect
creating the nation of Afghanistan as well. During Great Britain’s colonial era, the
country was used as a barrier against the Russian empire. Afghanistan attained
independence from British domination following the Great War in 1919, during which
the country was rule by a monarch until it briefly experimented with democracy. That
experiment with democratic rule ended with a 1973 coup and, again, with a 1978
Communist counter-coup (Meinshausen, 2010). The Soviet Union invaded to support the
tottering Afghan Communist regime in 1979, touching off a long and destructive war in
which asymmetric insurgency war proved greater than the use of conventional symmetric
forces. After ten years of an insurgent-based asymmetric war, the Soviets withdrew in
1989 (Meinshausen, 2010). In 1966, following the political void created by Soviet
withdrawal, a series of subsequent civil wars saw the country come under the Taliban, a
hardline Islamic-based, Pakistani sponsored movement that emerged to end the country's
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civil war and anarchy. The Taliban allied with Al Qaida for both political and financial
support as well as ideological fusion. This fusion resulted in the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks that became the catalyst for a U.S. lead coalition conducting military
action that toppled the Taliban and assumed the responsibility of establishing a modern
Afghanistan government (Meinshausen, 2010). In December 2004, Hamid Karzai
became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and Afghanistan's
National Assembly was inaugurated the following December (Jefferson, 2008).
Despite a strategy to create a stable central government, the loss of the Afghan popular
support in the provinces due to corruption and poorly executed national government
strategy allowed for a resurgence of the Taliban. This resurgence supports continuing
provincial instability, particularly in the south as well as the eastern regions that border
with Pakistan, where serious challenges remain for the Afghan Government (Robinson,
2014).
Afghanistan Tribal System
In its most basic definition, an Afghan tribe is an extended family; each tribe can
be traced back to a single man through a direct blood relationship (Meinshausen &
Wheeler, 2010). Tribal systems regulate the life of most Afghans with the tribal
members being heavily dedicated to their associated tribe in a manner that, when called
upon, they assemble in arms under the tribal chiefs and local clan leaders (Khans).
Islamic law rules Afghan culture. Each follower is compelled to bear arms at the ruler's
call, though this is seldom required (Meinshausen & Wheeler, 2010). The Afghan
peasant or merchant goes to war for much the same mixture of reasons as the western
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office worker or factory worker: partially having a desire for adventure as well as a desire
to avoid losing honor in the eyes of his or her family and tribe. The Afghan have an
ingrained dislike for invading foreigners that equates to fighting an outsider as revenge
against those that threaten his family, his tribe, or his faith (Meinshausen & Wheeler,
2010). It is the same Afghan culture, tribal system and socio-economic scheme that
terrorist/insurgent/criminal organizations receive support and recruits from – as well as
the national government military, police, and civil service workers (McChrstal, 2009).
Both sides depend on the acceptance and support of the tribal system and socio-economic
scheme.
Terrorist Organizations in Afghanistan
The Taliban is by far the largest and most active and effective terrorist
organization in Afghanistan (CIA, 2012). Its stated goal is to restore the fundamentalist
regime it established in the mid-1990s in Afghanistan. The origins of the Taliban begin
in Pakistan with the backing of Saudi finances. Because many Taliban members are
Pashtun in their ethnicity, a large part of the organizations support comes from
Afghanistan’s Pashtun community (Hammidov, 2006). The chaos in the lack of central
leadership created by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union allowed the Taliban to gain
popularity among Afghans due to the constant warring and the lack of stability created by
different Mujahidin elements in Afghanistan following the years of the Soviet
occupation. The Afghan people were tired of the fighting and lawlessness that had
consumed the country and believed that the Taliban would end corruption and restore
peace (Cordesman, 2012). Taking on the role of an insurgent against outside invaders,
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the Taliban has gained the reputation for being able to withstand both Afghanistan
Government and American led coalition forces that try to eradicate it (Kilcullen, 2011).
After fifteen years of conflict against the United States, the Taliban has demonstrated that
it has the ability to provide financial, logistical, and military support to its fighters,
followers, and allies. Many local Afghans have observed, as have coalition forces and
non-governmental organizations (NGO), that the Taliban carries out operations in
Afghanistan with the support of other groups such as Al-Qaida and the Haqqani Network
(Kilcullen, 2011). These groups frequently work together to oppose Coalition Forces and
the Afghan National Army because they have the common goal of ridding Afghanistan
of what they consider to be their chief competition (Cordesman, 2012).
The Taliban crosses the line from insurgent to criminal element through its
significant ties to Afghanistan's opiate trade, which supplies 89 percent of the world's
opium. For example, in 2009, the Taliban netted $49-$78 million from Afghanistan's
opiate trade, making it the group's largest source of internal funding (Harpviken, 2012).
A growing body of reports indicates senior Taliban commanders in southern
Afghanistan have expanded their direct involvement in the drug trade to include the
transnational trafficking of heroin, which could provide them with year-round revenue
( UNODC, 2010). The Taliban is extending its capabilities from local insurgency to
international criminal organization, which allows the organization to venture into regional
and transnational terrorism by direct operations in Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and other South
Asia nations – as well as provide planning, training and logistical support numerous terrorist
organizations in the Middle East and Africa (Roy, 2012).
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The Taliban as a Shadow Government
The Taliban was restricted in its ability to maintain the dominant power it held in
the region immediately following the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. By 2006, with billions
of dollars spent and thousands of lives lost in rebuilding Afghanistan, the insurgency had
not only survived, but recovered enough to begin gathering momentum as the dominant
political and economic force in Afghanistan (Bank, Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2007).
During a discussion centered on Afghanistan and employment of national strategy there,
Lieutenant-General Michael Maples (U.S. Army), functioning as the director of the US
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2006, told the Senate Armed Services Committee,
that he expected 2006 would see double the amount overall level of violence in
Afghanistan from 2005. Despite intensive counter-insurgency operations by the end of
2006, Jane's Terrorism & Insurgency Centre (JTIC) confirmed that there were 322 attacks
in 2006 as opposed to the 176 recorded in 2005 (JTIC Report, 2007).
The above-mentioned increase in violent acts was predominantly due the actions
of the Taliban and represents the significant factors behind the Taliban resurgence
(Holbrooke, 2009). According to a joint Department of Defense and Department of State
report released in November of 2006, the Afghan police force was largely incapable of
carrying out routine law enforcement or providing a basic level of security and
governance. The authors of the report concluded that the official figure of 70,000
trained police officers was inflated and estimated that only 30,395 officers were
adequately trained and equipped. The reconstruction of the Afghan National Army also
proceeded slower than expected, with fewer than 40,000 troops mobilized by the end of
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2006, out of a target of 70,000 (DOD Report, 2011). The report demonstrates the lack of
a critical component to the national strategy: the Host Nation must demonstrate that they
are stronger and more morally grounded in the needs of the population than the insurgent
(Biddle, Christia, & Their, 2010).
Although the Taliban still lacked the capacity to challenge combined Coalition
Forces and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces in open warfare, the increasingly
sophisticated use of asymmetric tactics (particularly the deployment of improvised
explosive devices or IEDs), and the introduction of suicide bombers employed for the
purpose of threatening the stability of Afghanistan demonstrate that the Taliban adapted
their strategy in order to survive and win against the Coalition and Afghan government
(Holbrooke, 2009). To support the chaos that the Taliban is creating through their
asymmetric campaign shadow governments have been instituted with their own public
support and justice directives. These shadow governments, headed by a selected
governor, are responsible for resource allocation for their specific provinces as well as
administering justice through Shari'a courts (Paul, Clarke, Grill, & Dunigan, 2013).
These shadow governments ensure activity is being conducted according to the Taliban
High Council strategy for regaining and maintaining power in the region (Hammidov,
2006).
Adversaries and Populations
A reoccurring disparity in the literature is the comparison between the types of
adversaries and the social geopolitical environment that an asymmetric war will be
conducted in. A common element that all warfare shares is that there will be adversaries
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opposing one another in order to achieve their goals (Hammes, 2005). Thus, warfare
requires an understanding of what the local as well as global populations’ perceptions of
the adversary and of the problem that created the conflict. This requirement is
compounded by the perception of the role of the Unites States, which is key to
recognizing the strategy needed to obtain national goals. Whenever the United States, as
well as its allies, engage in a conflict area, it is important to acknowledge the
nontraditional asymmetric battle zones such as mass media and social networking that
extends even to the most remote areas of the conflict area that are believed to be "off the
grid" (Toft, 2011). Those messages embed stereotypes and preconceptions of Americans
and western coalition forces. By virtue of their presence in Afghanistan (the longest
asymmetric struggle since September 11, 2001) American and coalition forces are
considered outsiders at best and, at worst, an occupying force (Meinshausen & Wheeler,
2010). In Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is often the focus of joint
operations when engaging in tribal or local outreach operations because members of the
ANP are mostly locals. The Afghan National Army can still be considered outsiders
because, usually, the units of the army are from other parts of Afghanistan. As such, in
an asymmetric environment, it is important to understand that partnering and working
through local national representatives can mitigate a good deal of local suspicion and
unrest as advocated through the U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN practices and
procedures (Meinshausen & Wheeler, 2010). However, COIN does not solve the bigger
problem of countering, mitigating and destroying terrorism.
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The strategist that develops national goals in defeating terror as a form of warfare
must understand the organizations and actors within the asymmetric conflict. These
opposing organizations in an asymmetric conflict operation are found in the following
four major categories of adversaries, which are: criminals, terrorists, insurgents, and
accidental guerillas (Jefferson, 2008). Each category of adversary has a different set of
goals and methods that they employ to achieve their goals. Yet, each adversarial
category must be considered individually as well as a single group of enemies in order
deal with each in a decisive manner (Pool, 2010). Many scholars, planners and
professionals have made a mistake in assuming that there is no difference between these
groups – as well as making the incorrect assumption that each group represents a separate
and different problem. These failures to understand certain distinctions have resulted in
the improper application of strategy and the resulting tactics being employed
(Hoolebrooke, 2009). These misunderstandings of the adversary and their goals prevent
successful accomplishment of the national goals and can be argued to generate
undesirable consequences (Fawcett, 2013). It is noted that criminals, terrorists,
insurgents, and accidental guerillas do use common networks and share common shortterm objectives. For example, a human trafficking network operated by criminals could
also be used to move narcotics, weapons, or money in support of insurgent and terrorist
groups (Fawcett, 2013).
Characteristics of Criminals, Terrorist, and Insurgents
A noted misstep in developing a strategy is when a “one size fits all” approach is
used in determining that all adversary groups should be lumped together (Cordesman,
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2014). Though many of the types adversaries, as well as the subgroups may deem
associated with the United States and the governing power of the conflict area as the
common enemy, they are different, not only in their ideology and goals, but also in their
strengths and vulnerabilities. The result is the use of only one strategy that is incapable
of properly addressing a transnational terrorist group such as Al Qaida and will
strengthen a criminal organization such as the Haqqani Network (Banks, 2011).
Typically, terrorists and insurgents are motivated by an ideological or dogmatic goal,
whereas criminal groups are motivated by personal gain. There are some groups, like the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that began as a political terrorist
organization with a socialist based political agenda and then evolved into profit based
criminal enterprises when the political objective was not feasible (Weisiger, 2014).
Many times, the criminal, terrorist, insurgent and accidental guerilla objectives overlap
and each group can be found crossing the boundary defining criminals, insurgent,
terrorist and guerillas as the situation necessitates (Toft, 2012). One conundrum for the
national security strategist is that criminal activity within a region is often misidentified
as terrorist activity, as well as terrorist organizations, routinely engages in criminal
activity, support insurgencies, and use accidental guerillas to further their goals (Tuck,
2012). Thus, the strategist must develop a detailed knowledge of the conflict area in
order to determine if direct and indirect attacks are occurring as the result of a terrorist
group, a tribal leader involved in organized crime, or as part of a tribal dispute with a
neighboring tribe (Schiff, 2012). A rocket attack (against a coalition base) may be
funded by a local criminal leader and conducted by a local farmer (filling the role of an
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accidental guerilla) in an effort to show his strength to a rival faction or to members of
his own family or tribe (Dobins, 2010). A strategy that requires these activities to
automatically be labeled as terrorism will result in the counter operations being designed
in a manner that will alienate the local population and support the terrorist
organization that had nothing to do with the attack (Meinshausen, 2010). Competition
between criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, and insurgent groups frequently
impacts the local population’s activities, which are compounded by the application of
counter terrorism strategy within the conflict area (Hoolebrooke, 2009).
While criminal groups are motivated for personal gain requiring support for
illegal activities through the sale of their criminal activities, terrorist organizations are
motivated to conduct similar activities, but for political gain (such as Al-Qaeda) and
attempt to influence the political arena by targeting a selected population, such as
political and civilian targets (Metz, 2010). Typically, these terrorist groups fail to garner
widespread support within the target populations that, under the established
counterinsurgency strategy, is a positive result of countering their capabilities (DOD,
2013). Yet, the transnational terrorist group understands that the support of the local
population may not be available to them, requiring that they develop techniques, tactics,
and procedures to mitigate the requirement of local population support by using limited
local supporters, planning operations in other locations, arriving the day of the attack to
conduct the operation, and leaving after the attack (Robinson, 2014). These methods
reduce the requirement of engaging the local population for support and yields the benefit
for the terrorist organization of having the host government or American military
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routinely conducting reprisals against the select areas of the local population, which, in
turn, results in popular support for the terrorist organization (Robinson, 2014). Terrorist
groups can be specifically targeted by law enforcement or the military without having a
polarizing effect on the general population, but well-organized and lead groups such as
Al Qaida understand the gaps between military and law enforcement capabilities and use
these gaps to exploit their goals (Thornton, 2007). Easily confused with terrorist groups,
insurgent movements that pursue the goal of revolutionary change with successful
insurgencies leverage wide-scale public support for their cause. A strategy that employs
control measures that would normally work against terrorist organizations when used
against an insurgent movement may alienate the public and create a wider base of support
for the insurgent movement (Priyedarshi, 2010). These groups can be confused with
terrorist organization as they use the methods associated with terrorism in that they can
be both outsiders, as well as aligned tribally, to a location and their supporting
infrastructure may overlap and look very similar (Pool, 2010). An anomaly to the
structure of the first three groups is the fourth group, known as the “accidental guerilla,”
which describes fighters that are frequently local tribesman that become involved in the
conflict because they are "overcome by events'' or "caught in the middle"" of a conflict
(Kilcullen, 2011). These individuals are typically locals who do not necessarily believe
in the insurgent agenda, but will fight alongside the insurgents because they either believe
they are fighting a common enemy such as an invader or for financial means to
supplement their income. While terrorists will willfully die for their cause, insurgents
may or may not believe that self-sacrifice is required, and criminals and accidental
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guerillas almost never adhere to suicide as a means of achieving their goals
(Meinshausen, 2010). The accidental guerilla can shift rapidly from supporting the
terrorist to supporting the host national government or even directly supporting America
if tribal, family, or personal gain support the shift. The impact that an accidental guerilla,
who are usually locals and thus a good metric for how the general population will support
either cause, provides motivation for the terrorist/insurgent/criminal element employing
the accidental guerrilla directly to conduct their war with the intention of using accidental
guerillas to fight against asymmetric foes such as the United States (Kilcullen, 2011).
Terrorist groups and insurgent movements are, in general, highly inspired to fight
for the organization’s goals, often to the death. They usually exhibit good discipline and
better training than local tribesmen and will organize themselves into military-style units.
Through international support, they have at their disposal a full array of weapons that
may include more advanced weapons with which to wage war against their intended
target in order to appear as strong as the governing and supporting militaries
(Meinshausen, 2010). Two significant factors that can force a terrorist group to shift
their focus from their ideological goals toward criminal enterprises are greed and
desperation. The terrorist or insurgent groups fall victim to greed when the lure of the
profitability of the criminal activity becomes more important than their ideological goals.
This transition disconnects these groups from public support and makes them a more
manageable threat. Yet, the criminal activity does provide an ability to fund their goals,
especially when the goals are modified from strictly ideological to one of gaining power
(Deng, 2007).
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Characteristics of the Accidental Guerilla
The accidental guerilla is a local who, due to circumstance, environment or
culture, has taken up arms against the host nation as well as outsiders. Frequently,
accidental guerillas in Afghanistan are armed with only personal small arms, typically
Kalashnikov and Enfield rifles in various degrees of repair (Killcullen, 2011). They may
lack magazines and small arms ammunition for a sustained fight and often demonstrate
poor training and marksmanship skills, as well as fire discipline. They dress in traditional
clothing and lack formal uniforms and field gear. They usually seek to break contact
immediately in confrontations with coalition troops. Most are illiterate (a few are
educated), but they know how to use and maintain technology ranging from
Kalashnikovs to cordless phones to building Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). They
are intimately familiar with local and regional terrain and tribal power structures and are
usually aware of outsiders that enter their village or area. Accidental guerillas may lack
motorized transport and logistic support. They will almost always join whichever side
they perceive to be more successful (Killcullen, 2011).
The degree of participation by the accidental guerilla will vary and can be
categorized as local nationals that will support insurgent group they align with (such
as the Taliban, or Jaysh al-Islam, or Kataib Thawrat al Ishrin) because they believe in
the propaganda, are ideologically motivated, and perceive that the insurgent group is
winning. They are also locals who accept pay from extremist leaders to fight or conduct
violent acts on a temporary (but occasionally recurring) arrangement of a few days or
weeks. Extremist leaders seek out locals with financial burdens for recruitment. Typical
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financial burdens include gambling debts, sick family members, impending marriage,
property purchase, and victims of extortion. Accidental guerillas are locals who are
coerced or deceived into working for extremist groups a n d may be forcibly recruited
at gunpoint. They may also believe that coalition forces will kill or capture them for
any past anti-coalition activity, no matter how insignificant or long ago it occurred
(Kilcullen, 2011). This type of activity may not directly support the terrorist or
insurgency, but many counterterrorist tactics will result in reprisal against the accidental
guerrilla – which results in the local population turning away from American military
objectives.
Equating Counter-Terrorist Operations with Counter-Insurgency Operations
The National Strategy for Countering Terrorism (White House, 2011) that defines
the current national strategy to combat and eliminate terrorism, as well as the causes of
terrorism, place focus on counterterrorism operations. Using Afghanistan as the model
for success or failure of this strategy, the United States employs both counterterrorism
and counter insurgency operations to achieve the national strategy (Kilcullen, 2013).
Counterterrorist operations tend to focus on eliminating members of a specific terrorist
cell, often using dynamic operations resulting in direct violence. Political leaders, as well
as military professionals, who support the concept that eliminating the organizations
network will eliminate the crisis caused by terrorism often celebrate this tactic (Gentile,
2013). Yet, when used against the insurgent, this approach has proven to be ineffective,
as the elimination of the network does not eliminate the underlying problem and violent
action motivates the host population to support the insurgency (Gentile, 2013).
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National Security Decision Makers and the Strategic Plan
In 2014, through a democratic process, Afghanistan established a new
government. As of October of 2014, the country instituted a Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) and a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the United States
(Katzman, 2014). For all of the political rhetoric that has been offered, Afghanistan is
still the forgotten war at a time when the Taliban is making significant gains in
reinstituting their authority. With the official ending of the longest war in American
history, the American experiment in nation building seems to have failed in that Afghan
noncombatant casualties are intensifying, the Afghan economy is in crisis, and there still
are no clear plans for any post-2014 aspect of transition which counters the Taliban
strategic goals (Katzman, 2014).
A significant observation made by both professional and scholars is that the
withdrawal of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 severely strained the
region's transportation/logistics infrastructure and this reduction in basic logistic support
will hamper the Afghanistan national government as well as the provinces and district
governments to maintain stability and control through commerce (Cordesman 2014).
U.S. diplomatic rhetoric implies continued support for Afghanistan without really
addressing either its weaknesses or its failures as a partner. Though the Afghanistan
National Army has assumed combat operations against the Taliban, as well as the
supportive terrorist organizations such as LeT and Al Qaida, various analysts suspect that
the National Government can maintain its power and control over the country against the
Taliban strategy to retake its power (Hultman, 2012). In December of 2014, the Loya
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Jirga, Afghanistan’s traditional grand assembly of tribal elders, as well as local
community leaders, overwhelmingly recommend a longer-term role for the U.S. military
and its coalition partners in assisting the country in maintaining its security (Katzman,
2014).
As it relates to asymmetric war and end goals for the Afghanistan strategy, the
surge's inelastic schedule weakened American leverage on Afghani political, economic,
and military influence against the Taliban and with the anticipated drawing down of
American forces, will reduce the Taliban's motivations to negotiate (Cordesman, 2014).
With the drawdown of coalition forces, the Taliban has changed its objectives from
surviving and resisting coalition forces to a strategy that involves confronting the
Afghanistan government to establish itself as the dominate political, military, and
economic power – not only in the country, but also in the region (Paul, 2013).
Meanwhile, its military and economic advantages gained from alliances with associate
terrorist or insurgent organization reduce its incentives to negotiate (Cordesman, 2015).
The Congressional Research Service reports that insurgents are increasingly confident, as
"ongoing withdrawals of coalition forces have largely corresponded with a weakening of
Kabul's ability to govern outlying districts.” An assessment of Afghan security forces
authorized by the DOD calculates that the Taliban will pick up the pace of its campaigns
and increase its influences into areas between 2015 and 2018 (Katzman, 2014).
In the intervening time, the Taliban incursion in criminal affairs has produced
revenues from a bumper poppy harvest, as well as other illegal trafficking. This has
resulted in the Taliban's incentives to reach a negotiated settlement being minimal. The
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venturing of the Taliban has resulted in more than a few of its factions demonstrating less
an ideology-driven armed opposition group than a profit-driven criminal faction (DOD
Report, 2014). Though the news is a black mark on the success of the Afghanistan
strategy, there is a ray of hope in that the Taliban was unsuccessful in achieving one of its
major strategic objectives for 2014, which was the mass interference in Afghanistan's
provincial and presidential elections (Cordesman, 2015).
The Strategic Vacuum in Afghanistan
The extent of the American strategy for Afghanistan and Central Asia is
demonstrated mainly through actual world events as well as the media’s impact on
American assessment to leave Afghanistan (Cordesman, 2015). Former Defense
Secretary Gates stated that the current national priorities retreated from Afghanistan as a
strategic principal for national security, even as the Commander in Chief sanctioned a
conventional military centered surge in Afghanistan in 2010 (Thomas, 2011). Then
following the surge, he designated a deadline of 2014 for a U.S. combat role to be over,
regardless of the status of the Afghanistan strategy (Gates, 2014).
It has been made clear that following 10 years of support, mentorship, and
protection Afghanistan still lacks an effective government; this represents a failed or
improperly employed strategy (Cordesman, 2012). Afghanistan is rated as one of the
most corrupt countries in the world; it has squandered its financial support and will
sustain the budget and economic crisis the moment outside aid, to include military
spending, is reduced (Cordesman, 2014). The current professional, military, and
diplomatic community judges that the national government in Afghanistan will be unable
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to generate and sustain an effective military and law enforcement forces without
significant financial aid, military advisors to support all levels of military, and law
enforcement activities – including logistic communication and control support (Katzman,
2014).
American rhetoric, from presidential speeches to key leaders pledging support,
implied a policy of continued support of the Afghanistan national government without
appropriately addressing its failings in governing Afghanistan independently – or its
failure as a partner in the war on terrorism by countering the Taliban and associated
violent extremist organizations (Hoffman, 2007). The reality of what the future strategy
of the United States in Afghanistan is reflected in the January 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance (DOD, 2012). This document states that the United States intended to leave
Afghanistan, concentrate on other regions of the world with the Pacific being the leading
area of concern, and thus basically fall into the habit of declaring victory when the
strategy changes and focusing on another area without a long-term solution (Savun &
Phillips, 2009). The document further called for the United States only to engage with
military or economic resources in such areas in which national interests are directly
involved and only in proportion to the importance of those interests (Cordesman, 2014).
It explicitly states the United States should avoid hostilities similar to the recent wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. A supporting statement suggests that, in the future, the United
States will avoid large-scale land-based conflicts that require American force
commitments in a conflict area of limited strategic value and, instead, focus on
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developing strategic partnerships where the partner would perform the central role of
confrontation with our adversary (DOD, 2012).
A Strategy for Disappointment in Afghanistan
The critical issue for the development of strategy is found in 2009 when General
Stanley McChrystal took command of NATO's International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) with the task of conducting an initial strategic assessment. That assessment, and
subsequent ISAF campaign, were based on the Obama Administration’s core goals of
disrupting and defeating Al Qaida, reversing the Taliban gains in political and social
gains, and strengthening the government in Afghanistan to take over the fight against the
Taliban and its associated organizations (White House, 2011). This strategy provided the
prospect of more troops, more civilian expertise, more resources, and more high-level
leadership attention. However, it also limited the time-span of these resources, allowing
the extreme violent organizations to survive and thrive if they could survive the surge,
which was contrary to General McChrystal’s assessment (Cordesman, 2014).
In December 2009, in a speech given at West Point, President Obama announced
that a troop surge would take place. Yet, he also stated that those surge troops would
begin to draw down in July 2011 (DeYoung, 2010). This statement created a direct and
determined date for withdrawing, regardless of the current events, the status of Afghani
forces to defeat the Taliban, and the Afghani government to govern in fashion that
ensures the two goals (Cordesman, 2014). In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon
Summit, the Afghan government and the NATO Allies, including the United States,
agreed to pursue a formal process, called “Transition,” in which responsibility for
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security would shift over time to the Afghan Government. This process was to begin
shortly thereafter – in early 2011 – and was to be completed by the end of 2014
(Cordesman, 2015).
President Obama announced parameters for drawing down U.S. surge forces in
June 2011. From the surge peak of about 100,000 U.S. troops, the U.S. troop
commitment in Afghanistan would decrease by 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and by
a further 23,000 by the end of September 2012, declining to a total of 68,000 by that date.
Afterward, the pace of further drawdowns would be "'steady'' and, at some point, the
mission would change "from combat to support” (Katzman, 2014). The NATO Chicago
Summit held in May of 2012 added a new step to the Transition process established in
2010. One major new step was that the Afghans national government was meant to
accept responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by mid-2013 and lead in
conducting security operations. The international forces that were then the backbone of
counter-terrorism/counterinsurgency operation, as well as nation building activities,
would shift to playing a primarily supporting role (Cordesman, 2015).
The counter to nation building activities is a strategy of reactive security as it
reacts to terrorist attacks. This counter results in negative response, by both the
population of the country through increased spending (which the taxpayer must fund) and
the target population of the strategy, through heavy handed security responses (Enders &
Sandler, 2011). The reactive measures result in actions that target terrorist organizations
following a terrorist event, but usually fall within populated areas, which results in
collateral causalities. The consequences of the action result in new recruits and cultural
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support for the terrorist or insurgent organization’s targets population (Chenoweth, 2013),
making the strategy one that in the cyclic in requiring more resources for more reactive
actions which in turn supports the asymmetric based terrorist organization while it
weakens the liberal democracies ability to maintain security and stability both home and
abroad, while receiving diminished resources as continued high operations drain the
treasury (Chenoweth, 2013).
An indicator as to how any well strategy for combating terrorism and conducting
operations is working may be found in the Outside Continental United States (OCONUS)
Contingency Operations (Flanagan & Schear, 2008). The trends, demonstrated in Table
2 (Cordesman, 2012), indicate that increase in both funding and troops allocated to the
conflict, a decrease in both amount of money and number of troops is needed before
sustainable security in Afghanistan may be accomplished. These indicators track with
the observation that major powers will grow weary when engaging in an asymmetric
conflict (Duyvesteyn, 2008). Thus, for the adversary who looks for metrics to indicate
success, budgeting and manpower allocation reports are key for the development of their
strategy (Duyvesteyn, 2008).
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Figure 1. Trends in OCONUS Contingency Operations

Note: Adopted from The U.S. Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013 Cost in Military
Operating Expenditures and Aid Prospects for Transition, p. 7 by A. Cordesman, May 15
2012, The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Strategic Challenges, National Interest Against Local Reality
Current discussion on strategy for Afghanistan reasonably commences with the
fact that the United States has interests in Afghanistan and the region. In theory, U.S.
national security strategy, as it relates Afghanistan and the region, should be concerned
about the spread of violent extremism, including nuclear proliferation from Pakistan, as
well as a destabilized Afghanistan being the fulcrum for a nuclear confrontation between
Pakistan and India (Schroen, 2004). This theory is successful and also allows for a stable
Afghanistan, quelling these concerns by making sanctuary less available to violent
extremists, encouraging state stability in Pakistan by lowering the temperature between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and by making Afghanistan less available as space for proxy
contestation between Pakistan and India (Katzman, 2014).
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In practice, observers and practitioners disagree about both the interests at stake
and their relative weight compared with U.S. interests in the rest of the world. The
Obama Administration reasonably and consistently articulated two core goals for the war
– to defeat Al-Qaeda and to prevent future safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(Hoffman, 2013). The Obama Administration made some refinements and changes in
emphasis over time. In his 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama described
the goal as defeating the core of Al-Qaeda" with no mention of defeating the Taliban,
Haqqani Network, or Let as transnational violent extremist organizations that threaten the
stability of the region and the world (Kilcullen, 2013). In a new and narrower
formulation, between 2010 and 2011 in its reports to Congress, the DOD revised its
description of the strategic architecture of goals, objectives, and activities, subtly
narrowing the scope of ambition (Katzman, 2014).
On May 27, 2014, President Obama made a statement at the White House that he
would effectively end any major U.S. role in the war by the time he left office, regardless
of the conditions that emerged (Cordesman, 2015). Following the DOD Guidance Paper
on National Strategy (DOD, January 2012), President Obama expressed support for this
statement in previous strategy conferences in which he would only provide support
similar to the number of post 2014 transition levels of military advisors, enablers, and
counterterrorism officers that the International Stability Force (ISAF) and the United
States Central Command (USCENTCOM) commander requested from a single year
(Cordesman, 2014). Since the American led coalition conducted a surge in 2009, the
strategy has been the rapid transition over of security responsibilities to the Afghans. In
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2013, Afghani forces assumed the lead for combat operations. This transition has
allowed for a steadily draw down by American troops and Coalition forces (Cordesman,
2015).
State of the Strategy
The basic premise of the strategy is to develop a competent set of Afghan forces
that can defend the nation from insurgents and outside influences while, at the same time,
reducing the insurgent threat that Afghan forces can manage in the future with very
limited support from the international community (Arreguín-Toft, 2012). By Afghan and
coalition accounts, the basic logic of the campaign has proven to be sound with this
assumption based on the overall improvement of Afghan forces training and effectiveness
in dealing with the insurgency as well as the adaptation of Afghan forces in conducting
widespread counter insurgency operations (Cordesman, 2012). This assumption by the
collation is arguably inaccurate, as it relates to on a report of Afghan forces falsely
reporting their gains against insurgents during Operation Mashaak (in which success
against insurgents was reported, but the reality is no insurgents where engaged) (Keeble,
2011). This type of action shows that a realignment of coalition activities from a strategy
to succeed to one of withdrawing under false appearances.
Many academics, as well as military and diplomatic professionals, contend that if
the strategy is not working, it should be discontinued immediately (not gradually) given
its extraordinary cost regarding lives being affected and resources being expended
(Cordesman, 2015). For Congress, the next steps in the war in Afghanistan, including
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near-term policy decisions by the U.S. and Afghan governments, raise several basic
oversight issues:
1. Do the costs associated with a continued U.S. force presence in Afghanistan
justify the means?
2. Resources spent on Afghanistan strategy should be used in "'re-setting" the
American military and restoring its readiness as it transitions from a
Counterinsurgency force.
3. How will the accountability for a sound strategy that protects U.S. interests be
measured and enforced?
4. How do the non-military U.S. government agencies integrate their areas of
responsibilities in support of broad U.S. political strategy for Afghanistan?
5. How will the appropriate prioritizing of this effort equate to conflicting
national security exigencies?
The key to these questions is the Congressional Report: “The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” (2014) that details
the cost in manpower and resources to support the strategy for Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Belasco, 2014). Figure 1 provides the initial
investment, the follow-on increase in manpower and resources with the sudden decline of
manpower and resources as the nation moved away from centering its strategy on
winning the conflict in Afghanistan, as well as Iraq with a focus on withdraw. This
supports the asymmetric conflict theory through the argument that an adversary does not
try to destroy the strong foe by directly overpowering them, but relies instead on the foe,
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in this case the United States, to tire from constant conflict, with victory always just
outside of the foe’s reach.
Figure 2. Boots on the Ground In-Country, FY2001-FY2017
In thousands of U.S. troops

Note: Adopted from The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11 p 9 by A. Belasco December 8, 2014, Congressional Research
Service Report RL33110.
How Does This Strategy End?
Most agree that the war in Afghanistan, with all its asymmetric warfare related
challenges and underlying cultural, religious, and political foundations, is unlikely to end
in a decisive triumph on the battlefield (Schiff, 2012). There is broad disagreement that
persists regarding what way the conflict may be best resolved so that a long-term basis
for stability in Afghanistan, as well as a U.S. centric perspective, will protect U.S.
interests over the long-term (Tuck, 2012). The current prominent approach to
asymmetric strategy is the war termination approach, otherwise known as the Doha
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process, which is based on a rather narrow concept of reconciliation (Sobek &
Braithwaite, 2005). This approach has become a high-level, top-down arrangement
between the Afghan leadership and senior Taliban leadership that employs a relatively
short timeline to identify common ground between the primary belligerents (Tarzi, 2005).
So far, use of this approach has shown the use of discrete confidence building measures
in specific functional or geographic areas as positive steps toward a formal agreement
(Tuck, 2012).
The launching of the Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar on June 18, 2013,
was a major event in the Doha process. However, there are many interpretations of this
process that explain it went terribly awry and infuriated many Afghans (Ross, 2007).
This failure was compounded by the Taliban insisting on portraying the office as the
political representation of the Afghan people and themselves as representatives of the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the country's formal name under Taliban rule (Katzman,
2014). This self-declaration of representing the Afghan people has created a firestorm
among the local tribes that are not Pashtun, which is how they identify the Taliban, as
well as the academic and business consortiums, resulting in further discourse and
political stalemate in the Kabul as well as support for the Afghan forces in the field
conducting counter insurgency operations against the Taliban (Katzman, 2014).
Looking Forward to the Results of a Strategy
Ever since the Taliban’s revival in Afghanistan in 2005 or 2006, Kabul has been
combating the insurgency with direct combat support, material assistance, training, and
advice from the American lead International Security Assistance Force (Coalition). With
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cessation of the Coalition combat mission at the end of 2014, the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) will have to battle a still-unbroken Taliban without key
Coalition-provided enablers it has thus far relied on (DOD Report, 2014). Strategically,
Afghanistan’s security forces are hampered by a national strategy copied by the
American method that emphasizes a security force presence in and the defense of
virtually every province and district in a country larger than France (Cromartie, 2012).
Tactically, the ANSF have continuing problems, including lack of cooperation between
army and police forces (which is a key element of a successful counter-insurgency
operation), predatory behavior antagonizing the local population through graft and
cultural friction point, the pilferage of supplies and pay and a high operational tempo
contributing to exhaustion and low morale in many combat units (DOD Report, 2014).
Looking forward, Afghanistan’s economic weakness makes the current level of
security force spending close to the highest in the world when measured against the
country’s gross domestic product (Vrooman, 2005). This alone makes any strategy
requiring Afghanistan to carry out American strategy unsustainable. Kabul's economic
constraints will compel a reduction of security force personnel to reduce costs and other
counterinsurgency programs that support nation building. This reduction would be an
unparalleled action by a government confronting a regime-threatening insurgency
(Cordesman, 2015).
Challenges Created From A Strengthen Adversary and Weakened Ally
The literature has indicated that tackling the issues created by violent extremist
groups like the Taliban, LeT, and Haqqani Network, let alone Al-Qaida without a
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flexible, but achievable, strategy creates great challenges, not only for the directly
affected area, but the region and, ultimately, the globe. Because such groups do not
adopt a fixed order of battle, their center of gravity is less easily defined than are nationstates. A violent extremist group's ideology and the environment in which it operates
make them poor candidates for a strategy based on finding and neutralizing a center of
gravity for such groups because they do not draw back to defeat mechanisms and, thus,
do not lend themselves well to critical vulnerability selection. By contrast, a group's
credibility with a local population is potentially a more useful concept for scoping future
operations as it satisfies established prerequisites, allows for the development of discrete
vulnerabilities, and allows for flexibility in planning. The core to building creditability
with populations requires a synergy among, not just the multiple military disciplines, but
also the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and social disciplines (DiPaolo, 2005).
Diplomatic work on the local level is the backbone of successful national strategy
yet this work building trust and relationships is frequently trumped by contrary US
actions, such as the United States’ responses to the Arab Spring have sent unintended
messages to Central Asian States and associated asymmetric group such as the Taliban,
LeT, and the Haqqani Network. This is represented in the open source reporting
demonstrating that the Taliban is initiating new attacks on Afghan children (Giustozzi,
2009). This can be relative as many Afghans do not view the new and resurrected
Taliban as the example of a just organization, but they are perceived as more consistent in
providing security and insuring basic community services than is the Afghan National
Government (Cordesman, 2015).
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The national strategy that relies on the Afghanistan National government to take
the fight to the enemy must adapt to the loss of asymmetric enablers and declining
funding at a time when Taliban military operations are more aggressive and ambitious
than in the past and as insurgents seek to exploit more permissive battlefield conditions
and spread perceptions of the group's ascendancy during the ongoing international
drawdown. The success of the Taliban strategy is demonstrated by the thousands of
fighters it a massed in 2014, after years of mostly small scale tactics hit-and-run guerrilla
warfare with the strategy that intended it to outlast the American and Coalition military
presence (Cordesman, 2015). It is expected that this trend will continue through 2018 as
the insurgency shifts to a more conventional military footing to directly challenge the
Kabul government and the Afghanistan National Army. As the American transition takes
place, regardless of the current events, the Taliban will demonstrate their ability to seize
ground from the national government, even temporarily. This show of force by the
Taliban highlights to Afghans the group's growing relative military capabilities and
reinforces perceptions that local security forces cannot provide durable security.
Conclusion
The literature establishes that there is a gap in American strategy, one that is
demonstrated through the last 15 years in which the American Security Strategy has
waned from the original mission of destroying Al-Qaida and preventing threats to the
nations to one of transition away from war at any cost. This change is due to a loss of
focus in strategic insight that was created from a lack of perception and attention to the
art of strategic thinking (Robinson et al., 2014). Using the same paradigm of strategic
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development, professionals and scholars have reported that the requirement for victory is
taking all available assessments into consideration in order for the Afghanistan National
Security Forces to successfully support the U.S. strategy of preventing Afghanistan from
ever again becoming a haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the Central Asian
States, and the Middle East, as well as the world, they will need a sizable force of about
373,400 persons, with some structural and posture adjustments, through at least 2018
(Katzman, 2014).
Current assessments of the ANSF indicate that this force is not likely to defeat the
Taliban militarily, but that if it can hold against the Taliban insurgency through 2018, the
likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the war will increase. So, too, however will a
negotiated peace achieve the goals as outlined by the national strategy (Schroden,
Norman, & Meyarle, 2014). The Afghan security ministries that support the national
security forces will require international support to maintain the current levels of
capability and, more than likely, significant support to keep some sort of capability
(Cordesman, 2012). The need for more than senior advisors to include lower level
tactical and logistical support at least to 2018 and that this assistance mission will need
authorities similar to those of the mission in Afghanistan today (Cordesman, 2014).
The literature has demonstrated that the current strategy of transitioning security
from American and Coalition forces to the Afghanistan government in order to achieve
the goals of American national strategy requires a sustained commitment of the
international community to Afghanistan. American strategists claim that this long-term
commitment is likely to mitigate tensions in the region and increase prospects for
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regional cooperation. However, scholars have warned that withdrawal or reduction of
international community support is likely to have consequences that are contrary to the
strategy of the United States, including a renewed civil war in Afghanistan, the growth of
violent extremist groups, and an increased instability in the region resulting in tension
between nuclear armed Pakistan and India as well as Russia and China (Cordesman,
2015).
The literature denotes that a national strategy must incorporate an understanding
that it has the ability to influence the regional and asymmetric global conflict by actions
taken on both a tactical and strategic level and should strive to take actions that will
promote positive consequences (second and third order effects). It is easy to overlook the
influence that a short-term operation has in the conflict area in asymmetric warfare. The
long-term approach must ensure that short-term activities, such as a security force, may
launch dozens of direct military attacks a day to disrupt a designated adversary.
However, the actions result in only short-term success and yield little support from host
nation population since the operations disrupt the daily lives of local villages. The
realistic view of what does work, how it works, and why it would not work need to be
implemented.
There are multiple cultures to understand in an asymmetric environment; yet, the
two with most impact are the extremist/insurgent/terrorist and that of the local
population. A strategy that includes an understanding of the enemy, yet does not take the
goals and objectives of the people into account will fail. The result will be an adversary
that gains strength at the end of American commitment and a population seeking stability
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and security regardless of who it comes from. A strategy that implements tactical
programs informed by an understanding the culture through partnering with local
representatives and redeploying counterparts conveys the cultural nuances of the
immediate environment of operations. Yet, nation building and cultural understanding
are not enough to achieve the strategic goals if stability and security are lacking. The
strategic goal is not only to defeat the extremist/insurgent/terrorist by taking away their
popular support or (more importantly) by mitigating the popular fear they create, but to
defeat the means, motivation, and methods that an asymmetrical adversary employs to
create or support the extremist, insurgent, and terrorist.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this study, the primary researcher conducted a narrative investigation to
discover the impact of the national security policies as they relate to the Afghanistan
conflict by examining the application and results of the policy. The researcher weighed
the impact of the strategy through the perceptions and experiences of both those that have
endured and implemented the policy. With this qualitative study, the researcher strived
to determine the magnitude of the security policy as it related to achieving its objectives.
The problem that the researcher intended to solve with this study was the fact that, after
16 years of conflict, the Afghan people no longer support the strategy as well as followup policies. An in-depth study of the results of the strategy via an examination of the
policies and operations was intended for a better evaluation of the strategy. The National
Command Authority was examined as a structure in the development of current and
future security strategy designed to the specific needs of the asymmetric warfare.
Collecting and analyzing this data can assist in creating an environment conducive to
developing a successful strategy and strategy implementation in the form policies and
programs for those responsible for defending the country.
The significance of employing a qualitative research method as opposed to a
quantitative method is that the qualitative approach was best suited to acquire and explain
the data needed to answer the proposed research questions. Of the different research
designs available in qualitative research, the narrative design is the preferred method for
examining real world issues, such as those resulting from the impact of a national
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security strategy upon the people that it is designed to secure (Creswell, 2013). The
narrative approach of examining a specific situation, in lieu of trying to examine a very
broad topic requiring an impractical survey, is a method that allowed the researcher to
achieve the goal of this study. Applying a narrative methodology allowed the primary
researcher to narrow down a very broad field of research into one researchable topic that
was manageable to address the research questions.
In this chapter, all issues related to participant confidentiality will be addressed,
the research design for the study described, an explanation given for the rationale in
employing the method of inquiry, and a rich description of the theory that justifies the
analysis. One element to explaining the purpose and scope of the analysis was the
selection and justification of the sample population. The role of the researcher will also
be discussed, including data collection procedures. Finally, this chapter will include the
data analysis framework, along with issues of the quality assurances for the work
conducted, the impact of ethics upon the study, and the measures taken to ensure the
protection of participants.
Research Design and Rationale
The selection of the appropriate research design is required in order to maximize
the opportunity of attaining valid answers to the proposed research questions as it
provides the scholar with a blueprint to guide the research process through the
examination of topics, populations, methods, and purpose of the study (Babbie, 2007).
This chapter of the study was designed to demonstrate my rationale for the concepts,
methods, and traditions of the research employed therein. The objective of this chapter is
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to validate the selection of the research methodology to achieve the desired outcomes of
the investigation.
Research Question
This research project focused on discovering and expounding on the information
that will address the central research question of: How do the American strategic
perceptions of an asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict outcome and
are Afghan public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive or negative
influence when it comes to supporting a strong stabilized and free from terrorist influence
democratic country?
This question is far reaching, which allowed for a broad area to research and
influence the answer. The following comprehensive questions were used to support and
narrow the research inquiry:
1. How is the effectiveness of conventional martial actions measured in
Afghanistan as an asymmetric conflict?
2. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people and Americans implementing
the operations of the strategy to combat the terrorist (asymmetric) adversary
and the resulting stability created from the strategy from 2001–2011?
3. What were the perceptions of the Afghan people on the presence of the large
footprint of international coalition forces from 2001–2011 and did it support
or detract from the strategy of removing the threat of terrorism and stabilizing
the country?
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Central concept. The most appropriate strategy to allow a scholar to collect and
organize data from participants is qualitative research. In particular, the narrative
method presents the opportunity for the scholar to be positioned to collect experiences
without being constrained by a structured questionnaire interview in the study
(Creswell, 2013). One of the major objectives of explanatory research is to build
theories that researchers can then use to explain a phenomenon to predict future
behavior or associated events (McNabb, 2008).
Qualitative research is the most all-inclusive method with which to observe the
impact of experiences that belong to a single person (Giorgi, 1997, p. 236). According to
Creswell (2013), a grounded qualitative inquiry affords the scholar an elevated level of
quality that allows the project to focus on the core of the research problem. The
qualitative research method is the application of narrative research that can provide a
specific contextual focus, such as asymmetrical battles or the affected population of a
nation embroiled in a terrorist/insurgent conflict (see Ollerenshaw & Creswell, 2002).
The benefit of selecting the narrative approach was the ability it afforded to guide the
research through an explanatory research lens. The explanatory lens studies the impact of
a strategy to a conflict area by using the testimonies of those affected (Beverly, 2005).
This design allowed the collection of data to be tailored to the Afghan experience by
collecting of Afghan nationals’ perspectives and experiences, which demonstrated
Afghans are the direct recipients of strategy activities that can determine if the strategy
was either a success, a hindrance, or contradictory to the national goals (see Chase,
2005).
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Research tradition. The employment of qualitative research results is an extensive
methodological approach that requires a submethodology to be selected from many
research methods to be employed (McNabb, 2008 p.274). Descriptive research is
accepted as a mean to conduct the most transient on means to produce a detailed yet
systematic analysis of the (McNabb, 2008 p.275).
The qualitative research method allows the scholar to focus on multiple methods;
this involves an interpretative approach to the target population (Denzin & Lincoln,
2000). A pool of information was collected, as a practical foundation for the study,
through interviews that included perceptions of strategy and policies as well as the
experiences of the participants. Employing a qualitative study better assisted in the
researcher’s comprehension of the participants’ experiences and how they developed
their perceptions (see Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). Seidman (2006) explains that qualitative
research gives a better perspective of the participants’ actual setting and how the
participants live their personal lives.
Qualitative methodology uses various methods of research, such as narrative,
biography, grounded theory, ethnography, or phenomenology (Creswell, 2013). The
commonalities in each design are that they are focused on participants who share the
context of the subject, yet the researcher employs an outsider-based interpretation and
control of the study (Creswell, 2013). The objective of this research effort was to
examine the experiences of persons that implement strategy and policies as well as
persons that received the actions of the strategy. Examining the works of McNabb
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(2008), it was understood that qualitative research has at its core, three broad
classifications: interpretive research, explanatory research, and critical research (p. 275).
The core to narrative research is the validation of the personnel affected by the
target issue through the examination of real life experiences as the means to measure the
research topic (Yin, 2014). The employment of life experiences is an advantageous part
of the social science investigation, yet the scholar may not always depend upon the data
to stand-alone for evidence and support for the conclusions of a report. Therefore,
scholars can use targeted documentation, such as relative government testimonies, fiscal
reporting, or other such data, to support the narrative. Utilizing chronology as the means
to establish a beginning, middle, and an end for the data collected provided me with a
basis for selection in my ability to collect accounts of the impact of strategy and policies
to discover the success or failure of the strategy. For these reasons, it was determined
that a narrative research design was appropriate for this study.
Role of the Researcher
The cornerstone for accurate research is the delineation of the role of researcher in
collection, analysis, and final deposition of data (Creswell, 2013). The researcher has the
role of the primary collector and moderator throughout the phases of the data selection,
data collection, data analysis, and report writing. The primary researcher was located in
the United States during most of the research process. There were no trips to Afghanistan
in order to collect data; however, some data was acquired from secondary sources, such
as published documents and information from Afghanistan. Key components for the
researcher in this study were the logistical, ethical, and personal issues that required the
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restricting of the considerable amount of sources for information that were available to
me. This restriction required the filtering of bias from previous research on the topic. To
mitigate this, a strict research protocol was used, applying the fundamentals of content
analysis and attentive to the identified units of analysis. Another challenge was filtering
the information collected through Afghan understanding of the interviews and ensuring
adequate documentation of experiences to ensure the data were not corrupted. This
possibility of corruption was mitigated through the use of triangulation of the interviews,
reports, and documentation.
Mitigating bias. The qualitative method provided a meant by which to
generalize a topic in order to capture a more diverse population (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, &
Liao, 2004). For the purposes of eliminating the bias introduced by the scholar, a
grouping process was employed to understand the experiences of those that implement
national security strategy as well as those that are affected by the activities that the
strategy creates. To reach the objectives of the study, the qualitative study was the best
method to conduct this study. The reality of modern war, especially one deemed a “war
on terror,” is that it is defined as asymmetric (Hammes, 2005). An adversary will employ
the tools of the asymmetric conflict, chief of which is the control of culture through
communication, shadow governments, and infiltration of religion to intermingle among
the people with the goal of mitigating the advantages of the host nation’s government – in
this case, Afghanistan (Bergen, 2009). The potential for researcher bias was seriously
considered and measures were taken to ensure that bias was both accounted for and
mitigated. An example of employing a mitigation technique is, for example, realizing
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that fifty percent of the participant pool is from the Afghan culture, whereas the
researcher is not. To mitigate a possible communication bias between two cultured, the
researcher selected Afghan participants that were formally educated, demonstrated a high
working knowledge of American style English language, and worked with American
forces or government officials in Afghanistan.
The research focused on two groups of participants: Afghan nationals, which the
previous paragraph addressed, and former U.S. Government personnel that implemented
American strategy in Afghanistan. A bias that needed to be addressed as it pertains to the
second group is the primary researcher’s military background and practical experience
with the Afghan conflict, which could have created an inadvertent bias. Contrasting with
other vocations, the profession of arms demands a constant moral contemplation
concerning the legality and purpose of its practitioners. This moral contemplation is a
balance of the expected military gain as it reflects achieving a strategy to the unintended
damage and injuries that are result from the actions. This moral discipline includes the
application of the rules for the employment of legal and moral acceptable application of
weapons and methods with at its core the avoidance of civilian casualties (U.S Army). A
soldier is required to make moral judgments as to what is right or wrong (MCDP 1-1,
1997). While conducting objective research, the inadvertent lens of a Marine’s moral
judgments about the data can lead to researcher bias. To mitigate this bias, controversial
topics (such as the effect of Islam on good governance), perceptions or conflict
resolutions of the war (such as whether Afghanistan a just war), and/or American
activities in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal as a precursor to the rise of the
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Taliban. This study focused, not on the personal, but on the research questions at hand.
To end with, this study made use of cultural experts to review the final analysis and
findings to ensure that bias was minimized and different cultural viewpoints were
respected.
Methodology
The employment of qualitative research results in an extensive methodological
approach that requires a sub methodology to be employed, selected from many research
methods. In order to answer the research question, it is assumed that qualitative research
is the most all-inclusive method to obtain the impact of the experiences sustained of a
period of time (Giorgi, 1997, p. 236). According to Creswell (2013), a grounded
qualitative inquiry affords the scholar an elevated level of quality that allows the project
to focus on the core of the research problem. Descriptive research is accepted as a means
by which to conduct the most transient on means to produce a detailed yet systematic
analysis of the (McNabb, 2008 p.275).
Qualitative methodology utilizes various methods of research such as case
studies, biography, grounded theory, ethnography, or phenomenology. The
commonalities, however, in each design are that they are focused on participants that
share the context of subject, yet the researcher employs an outsider based interpretation
and control of the study (Creswell, 2013). The objective of this research effort was to
examine the experiences of persons that implemented the strategy and policies as well as
the persons the received the actions of the strategy of the United States military in
Afghanistan. Cortazzi (1993) proposes that narrative research, with its centric asset of
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providing a chronology for a sequence of events, is the factor that places narrative apart
from other types of research. The core to narrative research is the validation of the
personnel, affected by the target issue, through the examination of real life experiences as
the means to measure the research topic. The employment of life experiences is an
advantageous part of the social science investigation, yet the scholar may need more that
the data for evidence and support for the conclusions of a report. Thus, using targeted
documentation from the Literature Review found in Chapter 2 (such as relative
government testimonies, fiscal reporting, or other such data) to support the narrative in
forming questions and sparking dialogue with the participants was useful. Using
chronology as means to establish a beginning, middle, and end for the data collected
provides a basis for selection in the ability to collect the accounts of the impact of the
strategy and policies to discover the success or failure of the strategy based on the impact
of that the strategy had upon the participants experiences. A narrative research study was
realized to be appropriate for this study.
Quantitative methods are valuable in clarifying relationships and differences
between variables. Although the quantitative method is limited, it can equate the
interconnection and origins of relationships in complicated settings (Cronbach, 1975).
Though sufficient in determining relationships in complicated settings, the quantitative
approach was not appropriate to tackle the requirements of the research for this study. To
understand the participant’s perceptions and attitude in order to measure the success or
failure of the strategy, a context-specific study is essential for accurate collection of the
cause (Maxwell, 2013). A quantitative research method would not be able to capture and
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interpret the experiences of the participants since a quantitative study is limited in
providing constructed variables (Maxwell, 2013)
Population and Participants
The principles of qualitative research sampling are to establish a process design in
which the instrument becomes the researcher. The researcher then develops a strategy of
engaging persons or activities within specific situations (Maxwell, 2013). With this as
the guiding principle, the participants selected were national security strategy and
counter-terrorism policy implementers and recipient of the actions created by the strategy
and policies. The participants were selected from two groups: implementers and
receivers. The implementer group consisted of participants selected from those with
experience with the Special Forces community in Afghanistan. The second group of
participants was selected from Afghan nationals that lived under the American counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan post-9/11. A purposive sampling was used to gather
participants to ensure that all participant groups were eligible to be part of the proposed
study. Neuman (2003) argues that the participants shall be representative of the centric
population directly impacted by the subject. Instituting a sampling structure facilitates
the ability of the scholar to identify the limits of the participants’ experiences with the
projects’ topic. The sampling structure distinguishes between persons who are viable
prospective participants and those who are not (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Focused
sampling allows for important aspects of the participant’s perspectives and experiences to
be conveyed, resulting in the scholar achieving a deeper understanding of the topic
(Patton, 2002).
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Such a sampling structure demonstrates that the participants signify the target
populace. It defines the function and the inclusion of the population group concerning
the needs presented in the study (Patton, 2002). The sampling structure is in line with
Berg’s (2001) discussion on how purposive sampling assists in identifying the individual
required in answering the research question and their attributes by identifying the
significance of their perspectives and experiences. The participants’ personal
experiences represented the recipient population and interjected insights to the issues
presented by the study. Though the original proposal for the study suggested the use
participation of 12 or 14 participants, there was five participants from the implementers
group and five participants from the receiver group used in the final analysis. Though
fewer participants than the originally estimated number participated, due to the nature of
narrative methodology, this reduction did not impact the scope or saturation of the study.
To achieve a thematic inundation on the subject: there are 10 participants divided into
two groups. The first group consisted of five former U.S. Special Forces soldiers, with
numerous tours of duty in Afghanistan; the second group consisted of Afghan citizens
that lived through the Soviet, Taliban, and American interactions with Afghanistan
during various conflicts. Using their testimonies in this qualitative research study, the
narrative approach provided valuable data for this study (Czarniawska, 2004).
Informed Consent
As an outsider, especially with the Afghan population, it was difficult to secure
the trust of the target participants. It was vital to obtain their trust in order to conduct a
successful narrative study (Maxwell, 2013). Before scheduling the initial interview and
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establishing the observation period, the participants were presented with the appropriate
informed consent letter (Endicott, 2010) that expounded upon the need for and purpose of
the investigation, as well as provided an explanation of the research process. During the
initial meeting, there was also a discussion that covered the introduction to the research
project, the purpose of the study, expectations, and information needed from each
participant. Thus, the data that this research is based on (both direct and observed) is
predicated upon the informed consent of the participants. To ensure that the integrity of
the research and confidence of the participants, the requirements of the Walden
University Academic Review Board were followed, including the requirement that all
participants are required to provide their full name on the consent letter. The personal
information that the consent letter contains was maintained in strict confidentiality. The
security of these documents, as well as others that may provide insider information on the
participants’ activities will be secured by a locked filing cabinet located in a locked office
with controlled access for a no less than three years and no more than five years. Upon
completion of this academic project, shredding will destroy the consent forms containing
personal information.
Confidentiality
As the research employed the narrative approach, the establishment of trust
between researcher and participants was paramount. With this in mind, the informed
consent letter that provided personal details about the participants will be kept in strict
privacy and confidentiality. To ensure the participants understood the confidentially of
the information, the informed consent form contained information explaining how the
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participants’ information will remain confidential and will only be released when
personal approval is obtained. The confidentiality statement explains, in detail, for the
participants the reason their information is needed and that their information is protected
and secure. This statement of procedure illustrates the scope of protection against
improper disclosure of information, which, in turn, improves the dependability and
validity of the data that was collected. To ensure the integrity of the study, the
participants signed an informed consent form to provide proof that they understood and
concurred with the participants’ and researchers’ responsibilities during the project. Due
to the structure of the narrative methodology in requiring personal interaction between
the participants and the scholar, the study’s privacy and confidentiality has been
stringently executed during this research project. The basis of the research required that
an environment of trust exist between the participant and the scholar; thus, an agreement
was reached between members of the research project that the information stated during
the interview would not be disclosed to others without obtaining the permission of the
participant.
Data Collection
The use of the narrative method of research required investigating the
participants’ life stories through multiple means of observation – from the direct
interview with unstructured questions, to observations of reactions to statements. The
instrumentation that collects this data is commonly an audio recording device (Clandinin
and Connelly, 2000), with which the participants recorded their stories, as well as a
journal, with written observations made by the primary researcher. The dynamics of the
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data collected incorporated the participants’ experiences, as well as their perceptions of
the research subject, required a data collection method that include observations,
interviews, and audio materials (Creswell, 2000). Clandinin and Connelly (2000)
confirm that the core to the narrative research method is, not only the collection of life
stories through observation and interviews, but also the need to chronograph the data into
past, present, and future ideas. To accomplish this, the scholar collected examined, and
analyzed the data into a “re-story” of information (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).
Unlike a rigid interview process, observations are made and participants’ stories
are recorded, but the manner and mannerism they engaged in while discussing the
experience is also noted. The face-to-face discussion with the participants employed an
informal or semi-structured series of guided questions that were used only to spur the
memories of the participants in order to support the researcher understanding the
participants’ experiences with the American national security strategy and counterterrorism policies in Afghanistan (Czarniawska, 2004). Employing face-to-face
dialogues in qualitative studies has advantages and disadvantages (Maxwell, 2013). The
benefit of the researcher having direct contact with the participants is that non-verbal
communications may be observed and documented, both of which add necessary material
to the proposed study to accurately capture the essence of the storyline (Czarniawska,
2004). Though the time to transpose the observers’ notes to the correct timeline is timeconsuming, the overall cost for collecting direct and observed data was reduced through
the data collection and transcribing phase being made simpler. However conducting
face-to-face dialogues with the participants with the challenges of time and replication
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that narrative method of research require is often a hindrance in data collection and
coding, since the data would be very narrow in scope as it is but a small group’s
experiences. Yet, this small group provided a lifetime of experiences and perceptions on
the research topic that supported scope and scale of research conducted.
Instrument Selection
The principles of qualitative research sampling include establishing a process
design in which the instrument becomes the researcher, who then develops a strategy for
engaging persons or activities within specific situations (Maxwell, 2013). The reason for
this is that qualitative research requires data to be collected that cannot be obtained
through a scientific measure, such as is used by a quantitative method. The narrative
approach is a people-centric research method that presents the goals, as Creswell (2013)
stipulates, for decisive test groups that represent the context of the subject from the
individual and the environment. This allows the data to capture heterogeneity from the
participant, which provides a critical exam of the theory through the lens of the data
provide by the participant. This method establishes a precise assessment for the goal that
variances between situations or individuals depend upon the selection of the collection
and coding instrument became the principal force for the qualitative scholar (Creswell,
2013).
Data management was provided by NVivo software, which is designed to sustain
the qualitative process by affording a non-numerical and unstructured information index
that is searchable, as well as to provide the researcher with a capacity to theorize (Nvivo,
2017). The simplicity of the product is reflected in the importation of data directly from

95
a word processing file such as Microsoft Word or a PDF document as well as photos,
videos, surveys, and audio files, all of which can be coded directly to the assigned folder
(Nvivo, 2017). The data management element allowed the researcher to view the
information through data groups that are visible to scholars as columns of data portions.
The groups of information will correspondingly permit the scholar to include field notes
as well as insert other documentation, such as updates of the information as the collection
and analysis process takes place. Support for the research is found in the program that
arranges the data into themes and codes. The program allowed for immediate feedback
of files and codes that provides an establish control of the data and enhanced the quality
control requirement (Nvivo, 2017). The strong point for Nvivo is that, unlike other
programs, it is not just an excellent data management tool, but demonstrates its value by
the ease of learning the program for a social scientist that may not have experience in
data manipulation. This ease, in turn, reduces the possibility of false interruption of data
through mismanagement of the tool.
Data Analysis
This project relied on the raw collected data to be transcribed and analyzed
through the NVivo computer program to code and analyze the responses collected. The
determination of themes and trends in the data provided by the individual responses
allowed the NVivo program to determine themes and trends – and reduced the
introduction of false analysis caused by researcher bias (Nvivo, 2017). One advantage in
using the program is that coding data provided by the program was more valid and
provided an easier means to verify the process, while the disadvantage in using the
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program was that the each sentence is not coded, but the content of the source. The semi
structured interviews used to develop a dialogue between the participants and researcher
based on the research questions posed in this study. Each face-to-face interview was
recorded and transcribed to ensure the validity and reliability of the obtained data, along
with all field notes and corresponding documentation. The NVivo qualitative software
analyzed the transcribed interviews to categorize developing themes as well as elements
of the information provided by the participants and the environment that added to the
insight of those that have implemented American national strategy in Afghanistan and
those that received the activities that the strategy created such as an Afghan national
experiencing a “Secure-Hold-Build” operation in his clan compound.
The core of the qualitative method of research is to solve the “how and why” of
the research topic, with the narrative inquiry being employed to gain these answers
through the discovery of knowledge based on a person’s knowledge, both experienced
and perceived, on the research topic (Polkinghorne, 1995). The stages for analyzing the
data from the interaction with the participant’s and the observations of the environment to
include documentation included:
1. Selecting the participants, developing the interview questions to support
dialogue, maintain observations notes of the environment and feedback from
the participant during the interview, and determining appropriate
documentation to review and interject into the dialogue.
2. Select the raw data to be coded and analyzed by reducing and eliminating
peripheral data to obtain the essence the experiences and perceptions of the
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American strategy employed in Afghanistan as the basis for success or failure
of strategy.
3. Employ a diachronic organization process to place the data in a linear
cataloging to formulate a beginning, middle and end of the narrative to
identify core themes of the experience and perceptions of American strategy
in Afghanistan.
4. Interpret the data for identification and verification of central patterns, themes,
and regularities as well as contrasts, paradoxes, and irregularities. The
interpretation of data is recognized as the researcher using the narrative
inquiry process of melding the interpretation of the narrative created by the
participant, while also constructing their meaning from their observations of
the environment, and sources of influences that created the narrative.
The narrative was created from both participants description of the experiences
and perceptions of the encounters with the employment of American strategy in
Afghanistan as it pertains to the American group and receiving the results of the strategy
as it pertains to the Afghan group (Polkinghorne, 1995). The process employed for this
qualitative narrative study assured the participants that trust in the process would allow
them to express their experiences as well as their perceptions. The collected data was
identified and analyzed appropriately. Following the establishment of the pertinent
themes and patterns, the assigning of variables was established. The interpreted data
included a final narrative relating the experiences and perceptions of the employers and
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receivers of American strategy were presented to answer the research question posed by
this investigation.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Evidence of quality. For this research, the use of the term “validity” is to confer the
strength of conclusions, as well as the overall quality of the research. Validity is defined
as the "best available approximation to the truth or fallacy of a given inference,
proposition, or conclusion.” (Yin, 2009) Validity, when applied to research within the
social sciences, encompasses four types: conclusion validity, internal validity, constructs
validity, and external validity.
Yin (2009, p. 40) discerns that the quality of a research design should be
evaluated by employing a logic test and endorses the following four tests:
1. Construct validity: Determine the functioning procedures for the concepts to
be examined. This is based on establishing operational sets of measures to
establish construct validity is probably one of the greatest challenges in
narrative research (Yin, 2009, p. 41). This investigation achieved construct
validity during the data collection findings.
2. Internal validity: In this study, internal validity seeks to establish causal
relationships among variables. Yin (2009) declares that every time an event
cannot be observed in case study research, an inference has to be made. This
investigation employed NVivo qualitative analysis software to support the
identifying trends and relationships of the collected data. The software
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assisted in pattern matching, resulting in the development of logic models
(Yin, 2009, p. 41).
3. External validity: The purpose for employing external validity is to delineate
the area that the investigation findings can be simplified (Yin, 2009, p. 40).
External validity determines whether or not a study can be generalized beyond
the narrative research. This study used the asymmetric conflict theory that
reproduced amongst the narrative cases to enhance external validity.
4. Reliability: Reliability validates that this investigation can be replicated (Yin,
2009, p. 40). To enhance reliability, this investigation targeted the data
collection phase using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a narrative
study database using NVivo, establish a chain of evidence, and reviewed the
findings. This investigation ensured that as many phases as possible in the
research design are explained and operationalized.
Ethical Considerations
In this research, the highest standard of ethics was ensured. Though there were
cultural differences amongst the participants, there was a set of moral norms that were
applied to a conglomerate of activities, in turn based on a code of ethical conduct.
Universal ethical codes are important in relation to cultural differences because ethics, in
its purest sense, enables a person or an organization to decide whether or not to do the
right thing when at an ethical crossroad (Roth, Todd, Stavropolus, & Babik, 1996).
The uniqueness of this study is the comparison of a central phenomenon,
(American strategy in Afghanistan) as it relates to two cultures. Though there is an
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argument that there are shared ethical values and traditions that cross cultures, there is
also a preponderance of research covering global ethics that suggests different national
cultures have different perspectives regarding ethical values and practices (Buller, 2000
p. 27). The ethical risk for this research was to view data through lens of one culture over
another with the results of a skewed narrative data analysis. To reduce risk, the study
does not judge differences as erroneous, but rather as simply different and thus coded
appropriately.
The maintaining of security, confidentiality, and anonymity was a cornerstone in
conducting research on participant’s experiences with the Afghan conflict. To mitigate
these concerns this study used data collected directly from researcher interviews,
observations, or direct supporting report analysis due to the potential risk involved during
data collection in an active conflict zone. Further reduction of risk is that no information
will be taken from vulnerable populations such as individuals under the age of 18 years
old or over the age of 65 years old, as well as those that are detained personnel. The
researcher coded all data obtained from the interviews by employing NVivo and certified
that all research was conducted in accordance with the Walden University endorsed
Standards of Best Practices, provided by the American Association for Public Opinion
Research. No data was utilized from sources with questionable practices or a biased
opinion on the research problem.
Summary
The first acknowledged modern counter-terrorism strategy of the United States
was outlined by President Ronald Regan; it specifies that the United States will react
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promptly and decisively to root out terrorism (Bank, Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2007).
During Regan’s presidency, five major terrorist events occurred and, since this statement
on counter-terrorism was made, every U.D. President has thereafter issued similar
statements, resulting in the United States dedicating critical national resources in waging
a war on terror. No strategy has been developed, however, that addresses adversaries
exploiting asymmetric warfare through terrorism. Thus, no metrics have evolved to
determine whether any particular strategy is successful. As Arreguin-Toft (2012)
demonstrates, by using the Asymmetric Conflict Theory to explain the significance of
asymmetrical war upon the current political environment, and functions as a warning to
decision-makers to get strategy correct, irrespective of relative power. Arreguin-Toft's
(2012) argument makes the perilous consequences of neglecting the significance of
strategic collaboration clear. Such strategies ought not be based on the Newtonian
paradigm. Instead, he proposes that choice incorporate the Asymmetric Conflict Theory
to develop a process to defeat the asymmetric adversary (Toft, 2012). The core reason to
employ a qualitative method using narrative research methodology in this study was to
determine what approaches to a strategic policy of employing conventional military
forces may be used in effects-based operations to increase the effectiveness of military
operations against an asymmetric adversary? Basically, how can using a strategy based
on employing a modified Cold War organized and trained conventional force defeat a foe
that adapts to challenging the nations will within all environments that touch society.
The purpose of this qualitative narrative inquiry is to scrutinize the experiences,
as well as the perceptions, of people that are charged to employ the American strategy in
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Afghanistan as well as the experiences and perceptions of the strategy as viewed from
persons who were affected by programs created by the strategy. The qualitative research
will investigate the probability that the success or failure of a national strategy may have
a relationship to experiences and the perceptions of the people that employ, as well as
those that endure the activities that the strategy creates. The objective of this study is to
add to the field of knowledge concerning the development and implementation of
successful national security strategy in the manner that allows for the mitigation of
terrorism and strengthens individual and national security.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The focus of this chapter will be to explain how data was collected and analyzed
for this study. This will include a discussion examining the process and methods used to
collect as well as control the data and my methods of interpretation. The purpose of this
study was to determine whether there could be benefits in shifting U.S. security policies
to include a greater focus on developing an asymmetric strategy to focus on the adversary
as opposed to the manner in which the conflict has been conducted. Two main research
questions emerged from this idea. First, can the strategy of focusing on the asymmetric
adversary within an asymmetric field of conflict and the threat of terrorism reduce the
terrorist organizations’ recruitment an provide a stronger, more permanent solution to
terrorism than employment of conventional military action in individual areas of conflict?
Second, what are the advantages for U.S. national security of employing this approach in
altering domestic and foreign security policy to achieve a sustainable reduction of
terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland and interests abroad?
There will be four areas of review within this chapter. In the first segment,
context of the study will be provided, including an explanation of the role of the
researcher while collecting the data. The second segment will include a discussion of the
collection of data as well as an explanation of the main codes and resulting application of
how the conventional-centric main code was applied during the analysis of the
documents. In the third segment, data collection methods and coding under the
asymmetric-centric main code will be explained. Throughout the second and third
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sections, statements obtained from the participants through the narrative inquiry-based
interviews will be offered. The final section will contain a summary of the processes
employed to obtain the conclusion of the study.
Setting of the Study
The Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) granted approval to
perform the acquisition and analysis of data to support this inquiry on May 10, 2017. The
IRB approval number for this research project is 05-12-17-0380121, which expires on
May 11th, 2018. The basis for this narrative inquiry was to obtain data through the use of
informal interviews with those personnel that implement national strategy through
policies and programs as well as Afghan nationals that receive the effects of the national
strategy. 12 to 14 participants were to be interviewed, but, being unable to find an
adequate participant pool, this study was limited to 10 participants. The structure of the
narrative process allows for a reduction in the number of participants that does not affect
the outcome of the study; it also has a noticeable impact upon the saturation of the data
collected (Creswell, 2013).
The initial basis for this narrative inquiry questions was to obtain an experience of
those who were subjected to the American strategy for the War on Terrorism through the
Afghanistan War experiences of both the Americans involved in initiating the strategy
and the Afghans that received the actions of the strategy. To support this inquiry an
examination of the strategy through a review of professional texts and scientific
manuscripts that specifically concentrated on the current war on terrorism and
subsequently focused on the counterterrorism/counterinsurgency operations in
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Afghanistan was conducted. The documents selected from the literature review involved
official policy and U.S. government reports to Congress. These documents provided a
sound foundation in previous studies in asymmetric conflict as well as current viewpoints
as to the policies and actions of the U.S. War on Global Terrorism and as its activities in
Afghanistan. Though referenced in this study, neither in-depth analysis nor coding of the
literature was completed prior to the study. Appendix D presents the coding tree, which
will be discussed in-depth in this chapter. Analysis of the documents supported the
findings from the literature review and provided strong data that addressed the research
questions. There was a requirement to detail the actual experiences and preconceptions
of those that have directly implemented or received the actions based on current strategy
and policies. Though the participants had numerous diverse experiences, it was initially
determined that looking at implementers of strategic policies as well those that receive
the actions of the policies would fortify the documents analyzed in satisfying the research
questions.
The purpose of this study was comparing, as well as contrasting, the findings of
the analysis by examining the participants’ stories, so it was determined that the narrative
research method was the most suitable form of research methodology to employ. A
narrative study is a research methodology of examining the individual’s experience of the
world and events that includes capturing both the experience as the perception of a life
event (Creswell, 2013). Employing the narrative inquiry in qualitative research has been
demonstrated to provide a straightforward version of the facts that have directly affected
the lives of the participants as well as the impact on their future decisions (Creswell,
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2013). This approach permits the participants who are involved in the research to present
their experiences and perceptions in their own words (Creswell, 2013). The requirements
of this study necessitated that the research questions were designed as to stimulate the
examination of the strategy implemented in Afghanistan as part of the counterterrorism
policy. With this in mind, narrative inquiry was applied as the final step in the collection
and analysis of the data because this was the most appropriate method to confirm or
reject the data analysis.
The goal of the study was for the participants to provide a detailed account of
their experiences about living and working in Afghanistan under the implementation of
American strategies and its potential effect on mitigating terrorism. The questions were
articulated in a manner to allow the participant to express their account of their
experience of living and working in Afghanistan. The information provided by the
literature analysis provided additional support for the interview protocol. Background
information about the participants will be presented, for the purpose of clarification,
including what contacts the participant had with implementers of American strategy and
specifically the intervention of American-led coalition activities from 2001 to 2015.
Demographics
In this study, the experiences of two groups of participants were examined. The
first group consisted of five Afghans that lived in Afghanistan before and during the
American invasion and occupation. The Afghan participant pool was selected from
educated Afghans that held various but respected positions within Afghan society. These
positions range from one lawyer, to two businessmen, one doctor, and a contractor
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interpreter/student. All of the participants worked with Americans as interpreters and
advisors following the American invasion and participated in the American programs to
stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. The second group of participants was selected from
former U.S. Army Special Forces operatives that conducted several tours in Afghanistan
to implement stabilization and nation building as part of the American strategy. The
Special Forces operatives were chosen because of the core mission of Special Forces to
work with indigenous personnel within a conflict zone to ensure victory through the
ability of the people of a nation being able to defend itself. Their work allowed them to
live alongside Afghans in a way that provides an insight into American policies and
programs in Afghanistan as viewed from those that are on the ground implementing
strategy in a way that no other group of Americans can provide.
Data Collection
The opening discussion with the first participant group (Afghanistan Group
[AFG]) began on May 19, 2017 and was concluded on May 24, 2017. The second
participant group (American Group [AMG]) interviews began on May 24, 2017 and
concluded on June 9, 2017. All members of both participant groups indicated that their
predilection was to complete the interview process during one sitting in its entirety but
allowed for the possibility of further interviews as needed for clarification. Ann
additional interview with the fifth participant from the AMG (AMG 5) was conducted on
June 23, 2017, for the purpose of clarifying data points after the initial data were
collected and analyzed.
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The interviews were recorded using a Sony PC compatible ICD-PX333 digital
voice recorder. The device employs voice-operated recording that starts and stops
automatically with of a voice. Each participant was allowed to examine the device and
approve its use during the interview. The device has a timer display, which enabled the
researcher to make notes associated with the time indicated by the comment or
observation requiring a notation.
The primary researcher supplied the protocol for the interview and the consent
form was sent to all participants 5 days prior to the first scheduled interview. The
participants discussed the consent form and interview protocol with me to ensure that
they understood the process and granted access under the protocol requirements. The
consent form was signed and returned on the day of the interviews. As is the custom in
conducting a research interview, the consent form and protocol documents were read to
the participant immediately before the interview to assure that these materials and intent
were accurately understood. After the interview was concluded, the recording was
transcribed using HyperTranscribe software that converted the verbal record into a
written one to allow coding. HyperTranscribe was selected based on the program’s high
reliability, ease of use, and the security it provided.
The significance of using a narrative inquiry is that it relies on the words of the
account (Creswell, 2013). One unexpected issue was the Afghan participant mastery of
the English language. All Afghans were formally educated and used the syntax of the
English language in a more proper way than the American participants and the
researcher. Accordingly, the word “asymmetric” was substituted for any word with a
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similar definition (such as irregular, unconventional, and, the most used word, guerilla).
The relevance of codes will be briefly discussed in the summary of this chapter, as well a
frequency chart provided, found in Appendix D. A copy of the corresponding transcript
was presented to each participant and all recordings and transcripts are secured and will
be kept secured per the procedures delineated in Chapter 3.
The Afghan group (AFG). The first participant (AFG1) of the Afghan group was born
in 1980 in Kabul, Afghanistan. The participant was born into a family of seven siblings.
As is the case of many families in Afghanistan, there were three generations living in the
same home. According to the participant, the importance of American policies was
notable from the very beginning of their life. The family had originally lived in a smaller
village outside of Kabul. During the father of AFG1’s early life in the farming village,
the grandmother determined that her children would receive an education from the
American International School in Kabul with a promise of better opportunities for her
grandchildren. The family then moved from the village to Kabul so that the participant’s
father and his siblings could attend school. According to the participant, the family
sacrificed all of their lands to make an American education a reality. The participant
stated that this was the beginning of the attitude toward experiencing American policies
that would ultimately be passed down.
The second participant (AFG2) in the Afghan group was born in Kabul in 1971
into a family of merchants. He attended the Kabul Medical School and became a doctor
of pediatrics. He supported the Mujahidin during the Soviet war, but did not support the
Taliban during their rule. It was during the Taliban rule that he became taxi driver with
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the experiences of talking to everyone in Afghan society. When the United States
invaded, he made use of his mastery of the English language to work as an interpreter for
the Americans. He worked with the Americans for ten years before receiving a visa to
immigrate to the United States, where he works within his family business. His ten years
of working alongside Americans gave him ample life experiences concerning the effects
of American policies and programs that it strategy create.
The third participant (AFG3) in the Afghan group was born in Kandahar in 1977
into a family of merchants. His family traveled throughout Afghanistan as well as trips to
Iran and Pakistan to sustain their business, which ranged from selling palm oil used for
cooking to household goods and carpets. This participant was also educated at the
American International School in Kabul where he received his MBA with a specialty in
international business. This participant remembers the Soviet war through discussions
with parents, but does have actual experiences with the Taliban during their rule as well
as the impact that America has made to Afghanistan since 2002. Upon graduating
school, this participant also worked with American forces as both an interpreter and
logistics contractor before receiving his visa to immigrate to America. He currently
supports his family business in Washington DC area.
The fourth participant (AFG4) from the Afghan group was born in a village
outside of Marjah Afghanistan in 1982. His father was a farmer and truck driver who
ensured his son was educated at Kandahar University, where he learned English along
with receiving a degree in mechanical engineering. When the Americans forces took
Kandahar in late 2002, he volunteered his services as interpreter and guide. He worked
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for 8 years alongside American Marines and Special Forces Teams as they conducted
national building operations. He became an American Citizen in 2011 with the
sponsorship of the Marines and Green Berets that he worked with and is currently
working in Iraq as an interpreter for the Coalition forces as well as a student in the
Northern Virginia area.
The fifth and final participant (AFG5) from the Afghan group was born in Kabul.
His father was a lawyer, and he followed in his family tradition by attending law school
in the United Arab Emirates in 2004. It was from his father that he learned English and
later mastered the language while at Kabul University. Upon receiving his law degree, he
returned to Afghanistan to work with the Afghan National Government. His duties direct
placed him in a position to observe American policies and programs as they directly
affected the Afghan population. He is currently working in the United States, but plans
to return to Afghanistan at a later date.
The American group. The first participant (AMG1) in the American group is the former
commander of the Asymmetrical Warfare Group and a retired U.S. Army Special Forces
Colonel. He is a Special Forces officer who has been in the Army 24 years with
assignments that included duties as an instructor at the coveted Army Ranger school, as
well as commanded two Special Forces Operational Detachment A-Teams (ODA) as well
as numerous other assignments during the10 years of the Global War on Terror. These
duties involve implementing counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency policies through
direct action, nation building and various staff positions both abroad and in the United
States.
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The second participant (AMG2) in the American group is a former Team Sergeant
in the U.S. Army Special Forces. Before becoming a Team sergeant, his job function
was within the ODA was Special Forces Medic in which he served four tours as a medic
and one tour as a team sergeant in Afghanistan. He is fluent in Farsi and Dari, the two
major languages of Afghanistan. The majority of the time he was in Afghanistan, he was
assigned to sector within the Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan requiring
that he live with the Afghan troops an directly intermingle with the Afghan population
while implanting policies and programs from a higher command.
The third participant (AMG3) from the American group is a former Special
Forces Warrant Officer. Before becoming a Warrant Officer, he served as a
communication specialist within an ODA. Much like participant two, he served four
tours as a communication specialist and one tour as Team Warrant Officer. He is fluent
in Farsi and has a working knowledge of Arabic. He served his Afghanistan time in the
Kandahar and Kabul providences. His duties required that he interact on a daily basis
with local the Afghan population as well as live with as trusted advisor with the Afghan
Government forces as they implement American policies and programs.
The fourth participant (AMG4) from the American group is a former Special
Forces Intelligence chief. Before becoming an intelligence chief, he performed the duties
of a Special Forces engineer with the task to help rebuild many of Afghanistan's
infrastructures. He also has many tours in Afghanistan with three tours as an engineer,
one tour as an intelligence chief and two tours as a contractor working for the U. S. State
Department. He speaks Farsi and Dari as well as French.
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The fifth participant (AMG5) from American group is a former Special Forces
intelligence chief with seven tours in Afghanistan. He speaks Farsi, Pashtun, and Dari,
which has allowed him to work alongside Afghan nationals as an advisor to the
Afghanistan government as well as advised very senior district, province, and country
officials. He holds a Masters of Science degree in Internal Affairs from University of
Maryland and is the most experienced of the participant in observing the cause and
effects of American policies and procedures during the Afghans war.
Data Analysis
In order to analyze the experiences of the participants with American strategy and
policy implementation as well as develop a foundation for the parameter questions
utilized in the narrative inquiry, an examination of the transcripts was conducted. The
control of this study was through the establishment of three distinct categories.
Anonymity was ensured through the assigned a designation that could not specify an
identity of the person contributing direct statements and general discussion points. These
designations can be found later in this chapter. The three stages of the analysis consisted
levels of review. Codes were developed into two general categories that support the
theory and the research questions. The parent code categories representing the theoretical
basis for the study were conventional-centric (CC) and asymmetric-centric (AC) and
aligned with definitions of these terms as found in Arreguin-Toft (2012).
The research questions concerned the benefits that can be realized for national
security through the provision of an asymmetric warfare strategy. The nature of the study
established the need to use the same codes in each phase of data collection. To satisfy the
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research questions regarding actions that would influence countering and mitigating the
threat of terrorism through conventional centric (military) interventions or asymmetric
centric (irregular warfare) interventions involving developing an asymmetric strategy that
addresses multiple elements of the conflict. The analysis produced sub-codes that,
though necessary, were different, but shared characteristics for these areas. There were a
limited number of codes secondary to the specific target of the study. More codes were
not necessary to answer the research question. These codes were specifically the research
question and addressed the general nature of the research questions.
For clarification of the process, please see Figure 3, which provides a diagram of
the asymmetric centric (AC) coding framework used to analyze data in this study. A
similar coding framework was used for Conventional centric (CC) codes. Figure 2 also
illustrates the process for data collection.
Figure 3. Illustration of the Process for Data Collection
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The coding process derived the distinction between American-centric based on
the American group and Afghanistan-centric based on the Afghanistan group. The most
predominant aspect that determined what was categorized as conventional centric or
asymmetric centric was the theme that arose from that specific portion of the data. If the
overall theme indicated that the experiences from actions or policy were directed toward
direct action with enemy combatants or insurgents, then the data was placed in the
category of conventional centric. If the initial focus was applied directly toward terrorist
organizations, then the data was coded under “conventional centric.” The same process
was applied to the asymmetric centric codes as well as the initial focus that determined
that the actions applied toward holistic action and reaction toward the national threat then
the data was coded toward asymmetric centric.
The application of sub-codes was determined by examining the factors of the
coded statement. Many of these applications were quite simple in that most of the
comments were specific in the sub-code areas. This minimal design provided for a
detailed examination and analysis of the documents. The main codes chosen were
simple, conventional centric and asymmetric centric. The child codes (security, growth,
and stability) were used under both of the main codes. Likewise, the sub-codes were also
used in both of the main codes. This was designed to examine the data consistently for
both of the approaches. A full coding chart can be found in Appendix D, and detailed
explanations of the specific sub-code findings are included within each section.
Nvivo Mac software was chosen as the tool for processing the codes (QRS
International, 2017). The Nvivo Mac software is designed for coding systems from
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simplistic to complex as well as assist in developing themes and grouping the codes. All
of the interview transcripts and field notes were converted into text or “. txt" documents
to be used in the coding software. The design of the coding tool supports the researcher
that may not be a cyber-authority, making the coding task more accurate. Following data
entry, the information is converted into detailed codes and grouped with the codebook.
The manipulation of the program was assisted with a continuously available tutorial that
provided interactive training program from the NVivo company. The initial level of
coding was performed first to gain an aspect as to what the data presented. The codes
were applied to the testimony and any additional statements made by participants.
Possible discrepancies in the software coding could have occurred due to
language syntax employed by the participants. The researcher who determined the code
following the first stage is that the transcripts were manually coded using a highlighter
with specific colors for designating each sub-code mitigated this possible discrepancy.
Though the process is redundant, it does assist as a means to confirm many codes applied
to the analysis as well as ensured quality control method outside of the software is
employed that supports the placement the codes in significant categories (security,
stability, growth). The final step to the interview analysis coding process was a top-level
application of codes. The child codes were applied to the two main codes (conventionaland asymmetric-centric). Following this level, a frequency report of each level was
entered into an Excel spreadsheet. The frequency report for the document analysis will
be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
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Coding is a method that is extensively utilized by the social scientist for
qualitative research is to find and document the themes contained in the statements is to
use the theme or "within words" technique (Saldana, 2009). The analysis of these themes
found within the statements requires numerous levels of examination to ensure the codes
were accurately interpreted and applied with the intention of the participants and
documents are entirely understood.
Narrative Inquiry Process
The asymmetric centric and conventional centric approaches are defined within
this study as those actions encompassed by the War on Terror to include Operation
Enduring Freedom, the American lead action in Afghanistan. The asymmetric centric
approach is a designator that concentrates the specifics of the asymmetric methods in
many different aspects of power through force, cultural, economic and political avenues
in countering the threats that create terrorism in the country rather than focusing actions
solely on the conventional centric program that employs a singularly military solution to
the problem. Originally, a bias that the researcher may have identified was based on
historical events; in other words, all actions from the U.S. military might be primarily
conventional centric. However, a majority of documents from the literature review make
statements that lead to the asymmetrical-centric side of the study. For example,
documents DOD Document Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership (2014) and DOD Report
on the Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (2014) have overwhelming
statements of asymmetric-centric themes.
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In the DOD Report on the Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
(2014), presents the testimony of the military commanders of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2009 operations. This statement reflects numerous comments
from the participant groups relationship of having non-military government agencies, he
states, "we work together to figure out what's going to be required as we provide security
to make it more durable, because the governance and development parts need to flow in
almost simultaneously" (DOD, 2014, pg. 205). This statement, from a military official, is
only one of many that indicate the development of civilian government and the continued
internal security and welfare are the intentions of the U.S. and the ISAF in general. The
official continues in his testimony stating that larger issues in the area of asymmetriccentric reforms are in many cases a more in-depth time consuming issue (DOD, 2014).
Analysis Through Theoretical Foundation and Conceptual Framework
The explanation for the responses that the participants give on their perceptions
of the American strategy for the war, it is arguable certain that “asymmetric” is amongst
the broadest if not the most encompassing. This study has placed that the Asymmetrical
conflict theory can be categorized through the examination of various existing and
potential concepts of asymmetric conflict (Chase, 2011). Employing the asymmetrical
conflict theory in analyzing the responses of the participants can characterized three
different sub-themes through which asymmetry may be deduced as it applies to strategy.
These three sub-themes to strategy are “security, stability and economic growth which
represents the arenas that the conflict is waged within. Thus, this recent approach in
defining strategy can result in a misunderstanding through the misapplication of the terms
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asymmetry strategy and/or asymmetric conflict distorts the adversary and leads us to
make major strategic blunders (Angstrom, 2011). This is demonstrated in the strategy of
concentrating on threats rather than adversarial strategies. By employing the asymmetric
conflict theory over conflict theory, the examination of strategy for Afghanistan to be
understood through the strategic nature, goals, and overall concepts of American strategy
in Afghanistan as judged by the operations the strategy dictates (Peceny & Bosin, 2011).
Strategy through Security
The indication that asymmetric-centric themes in providing a strategy for longterm security and stability to allow Afghanistan to grow out of being a receptacle for
terrorism are referenced in both participant groups in which the theme was noted 43
times. The language of the testimonies indicates that metrics being used by the Coalition
is directed to the developing, maintaining, or protecting internal stability and security of
the country with a reliance on the development and training of the Afghan National Army
with a lesser degree of focus on the development of the National Police. The army is not
being raised as a field army that repulses foreign attacks but in line with working with an
internal police force that is focused on a civil stability for the nation. The child codes
obtained from the Afghan group indicate that more interaction between the police and
Afghan Army is missing, creating a lack of stability and security. AMG5 participant
gave a strong reference that the strategy is focused on recruiting and training the army as
well the subsequent police force. Though the strategy is focused on the Afghans
protecting themselves from outside intervention as well as defeat the ongoing insurgency
When asked about the operations of the Coalition forces with the Afghan National Army
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and Police, the second Afghan-group participant stated, "I think the need for the coalition
to build the national army while conducting operations is a requirement. I believe this
because the strategy to secure Afghanistan and its borders, which includes the need for a
strong military arm to safeguard the nation against domestic as well as foreign
intervention." The participant demonstrated his passion for the need for a strong military
that works with American and coalition forces. He expressed this sentiment in the failed
rollout of Afghan operations with the follow-up statement of, "The issue is that the
strategy to develop an Afghanistan National Army did not take into account the local
culture or the needs of the tribes. This is demonstrated by the current culture that the
Afghan National Army as it stands currently does not have a culture of soldiers being
faithful to the nation or sees the United States as a partner against terrorism. An
explanation for this is based on the all of the Afghan-group participants indicating that
the haphazard way that America has been conducting this war of ideas, which results in
people not wholeheartedly accepting the narrative that America only wants to help and is
not an invader. The current culture, especially in the rural areas, cannot accept that
America's goal is to help them obtain their freedom from the Taliban" (AFG2).
The asymmetric centric core codes reveal that American and Afghan security
operations working with stability operations (AC1b & AC2b) were the two most
prominent themes. Personal security (AC2b) was prominent with the term used ten
separate times during the dialogue, which is supported, by term Afghan national security
(AC1b) being revealed nine instances within the document. The information depicted in
the “DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan" (2014) is
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based on a detailed report to Congress that addressed the abilities of the Afghan national
government to protect the people. This report is predominantly focused on U.S.
government programs that the support of Afghan national government actions in
Afghanistan, which includes the use of conventional U.S. troops. The majority of the
report involved U.S. troops conducting operations aimed at securing a designated area,
with minor programs focused on training Afghan personnel with the goal of leaving the
area recently secured under the protection of Afghan Security Forces.
It is observed that this DOD Report (2014) contains multiple references in which
the actual strategy of U.S. forces securing a particular area had the ultimate goal of the
areas security to be left to the Afghan forces recruited across the country with the mission
to provide area security and the rule of law. A note source of information indicates that a
large amount of the American troops were elementary aged children at the time of the
9/11 attacks which was the catalyst U.S. actions in Afghanistan which leads to the
observation that they may have an inadequate recollection of the 9/11 attacks. The
significance of this element of data is that the conventional based operations for seizing,
securing and stabilizing have continued for so many years, that many of the military
personnel fighting the conflict were in the first grades of elementary school when the
2001 attacks on the U.S. occurred. This point was observed by the AFG2 in that he
states: "After 15 years after the initial U.S. intervention in Afghanistan indicating that the
strategy in using conventional methods is either slated for this style of war."
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Strategy Through Stability
The participants’ interview results display a premise that stability is a key element
of strategy by the issue that stability is mentioned eight times by the Afghan group and
seven times by American group. The codes frequency pertained in the conventionalcentric-local stability (CC3b) section. The testimony is directed at the strategy of relying
on Afghan Security Forces (ASF) as the linchpin of the U.S. strategy for establishing and
maintaining stability in the region with only assistance provided by the U.S. or Coalition
forces. Though the discovery of the code is noteworthy, this testimony was in the area of
personal security (CC2b) and not stability CCb3). The goal of country and implication is
that Afghanistan security is the major theme within these documents. This was coded as
being conventional-centric because the focus is on conventional forces, either traditional
civilian government agency being the catalyst for security.
An observation was made from both groups of participants that revolve along
asymmetric-centric codes through the method that employed separate civilian programs
to build the stability through welfare programs for Afghan citizens with a focus on nonmilitary agencies activities. The analysis was centered on methods that employed
separate civilian programs to build the stability through welfare programs for Afghan
citizens that are administered by U.S. citizens. AFG5 asserts that it is the civilian
authority that is fundamental to the national security of Afghanistan even more than
military power. This theme is supported by the interviews with AFG1, AFG3, and AFG4
as well as AMG1 and AMG5 participants, though not its intention the codes that the
interviews provided demonstrate the lack of cohesion between conventional military
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programs aims at establishing security and civilian-based programs aimed at providing
stability. The codes from all participant interviews to include both the Afghan and
American groups indicating that there is a lack of cohesion through the use of
conventional based war over an asymmetric one. The coding suggests that regardless of
the U.S. agency, the American focus is on the use of conventional centric approaches for
establishing stability and security.
A more detailed examination of the Afghan participant group interviews brings to
light the collection of testimonials as to the need or impact American policies programs
in relationship to stability for the various regions. It must be noted that when addressing
conventional centric approaches, participant AFG3 mentions that American policies are a
deterrent to violence. The participant further explained that civilian power is as
fundamental to national security as military power is, yet the testimonies indicate the
failure of the two working in unison, which is a requirement for asymmetric methods
(Arreguin-Toft, 2012). This testimony places the belief of the participant on the failure
of the approaches and disjointed of the programs that were recommended and intended to
become policy for this government agency. The programs as relayed by participant
AMG1 demonstrates that the strategy that non-military U.S. government agencies are
more prone to develop civilian building programs as an approach to concluding the
struggle was confirmed through coding. The parent code regarding asymmetric centric
strategies is found forty times throughout the document.
The American and Afghan participant groups responded to interview questions by
indicating the limited mention of security and stability as a global strategy as a result of
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American activities in the U.S. as well as Afghan policy statements and documents. The
participants replied that, at first glance, it is hard to know exactly why the mention of
strategy based on security and stability for Afghanistan is lacking. Participant AMG5
stated: "when you look at the business development sector, there is a fair amount of work
in American asymmetric policies. “ The participant continued to be somewhat perplexed
by the question stating, "I have not given much thought to that.” After thinking for a
short period, the participant did state, "In the first couple of years, early in the
intervention in Afghanistan, 2001, 2002, 2003, there was a lot of focus on stability and
democracy by ensuring every Afghan is franchised. Sadly the emphasis appeared to be
on numbers that reflected quantity over a deep-seated embedment into the culture that
would be required for success."
During the interview process, the participants from both groups were asked about
personal experiences and the personal influences of American strategies for Afghanistan
as it relates to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Interview Questions 1-10 were
answered mutually through the narrative that followed. These questions were related to
the influence that American policies had on the Afghan's character and that influence in
potential involvement in violent or peaceful activities. The participant AFG1 and AMG5
mutually identified that the early American policies experiences while foundational for
removing the Taliban did not have an impact on the future in these areas. It was
sometime during the 2002 military campaign that American policies influenced these
areas of security and stability. Participant AFG1 was very explicit about the impact that
American counterterrorism and counterinsurgent strategies had on current events
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personally. The statements indicated that the current strategy involving
counterterrorist/counterinsurgent are directly proportioned to the effectiveness of nation
building based on foreign aid for developing countries. A specific target for this direct
action as a result of a national strategy is the humanitarian and nation-building programs
amount and type found in Afghanistan. The American Group participants indicated that
they are always thinking of using favorable asymmetric policies to aid in developing an
environment of security and stability for Afghanistan. The account maintained the
comparisons to mastering a mystery of what works and what does not. This accounting
of policies and programs includes the allocation of funding to specific programs that are
in most cases not interrelated with a single strategy or measure for success in nation
building or countering the threats to security and stability. So, according to the answers
of the American Group of participants, there was most definitely an American strategy
whose influence is locally positive yet overall on the strategic level has not been positive.
Strategy Through Growth
The additional analysis of child codes under the asymmetric-centric approach
exposed that a preponderance of data from the codes falls along the growth category.
Twenty-three codes were found relevant to the asymmetric-centric approach. The
quantity of indicators aligning with the growth (also mentioned by participants as
prosperity) category is very close to the stability child codes that were applied 22 times in
the interviews. The growth categories 23 indicators found the category had 14 observed
to be within the sub-code of the rule of law (CC2a). The sub-code of personal security
had eight indicators (CC2b). The remaining code was concluded to be general to the
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larger child code category (CC2). It is observed that 20 separate instances political
corruption was mentioned as a supporting argument. These were unambiguous
testimonials to desire for the empowerment of the Afghan citizens as the process of selfrule. The revelation of the empowerment testimony is in a general sense but was notable
in several sections explicitly mentioning gender guidelines for education in Afghanistan
three times within the document. According to AFG4, "there should be a mutually
created standard that respects our culture. This will ensure common ground for the
development of tribal and business owner assistance."
Child codes for asymmetric-centric-stability (AC3) were noted almost as many
times as child codes under growth (AC2). Of the 32 times that AC3 codes were applied,
19 of them were applied under the sub-code of regional stability (AC3a). Participant
AMG5 formulated possibilities and experiences to Afghanistan stability with a nonconventional military action such as American-Afghanistan business partnerships will
lead to economic and cultural growth. This particular sub-code was noted multiple times
throughout the document and specifically several times in relation to Afghanistan.
Supporting AMG5 comments is the "DOD Report on Progress Toward Security and
Stability in Afghanistan” (2014) tracks indicate that the forces of instability and natural
disasters will increase over the next decade in areas critical Afghan prosperity (DOD
Report, 2014). The testimonial along with this document reinforces the requirement for
an asymmetric-centric approach to developing a strategy with its direct application to the
security of the U.S..
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The previous observation denotes there is a direct correlation of economic growth
to Afghanistan internal protection. The child codes that aligned with the asymmetriccentric security (CC1) are found 12 times in the Afghan participant group document and
nine times within the American participant group. Deciphering the child codes and subcodes under security, American national security (CC1a) was applied eight times in the
document and Afghan Security (CC1b) was applied twice. The remaining two codes fell
into the general category of Security (CC1). A point of observation is that the report does
support the testimonies of the Afghan group in continuing to work with other U.S.
activities to secure regions that are characterized as high risk for U.S. interests.
The literature review conducted in Chapter 2 provided an examination of the
American strategy and policy process. These documents also addressed the potential
strategies and policies that could exist within the war on terror through established
actions conducted by a conventional centric approach to directly focusing on the enemy.
The literature demonstrated that American strategy and resulting policies are
concentrated in a conventional-centric-U.S. security (CC1a) sub-code. It should be noted
that participant AMG1 cautions against the potential of alienating cultures through
violations of basic human rights resulting from strategies and policies that directly
confront those that support terror in a direct military fashion.
Following the preliminary coding process of the participants demonstrated a
portion of studying strategy to improve it was less than helpful in addressing the research
questions initially proposed. It is affirmed that a qualitative analysis of this study with
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the goal to influence positive social change should take into account this the differences
between the literature, reported information, and the testimonies of the participants.
The American group of participants referred the funding for programs both
military (conventional centric) and welfare (asymmetric centric) program with and goals
that relate to the strategies and follow-on policies for Afghanistan. The American group
stated that funding is a key metric for establishing and maintaining security and stability
in Afghanistan as well as the success rate for the growth programs that support the
national strategy. According to AMG5, "the United States redeveloped its strategy for
Afghanistan from the asymmetric support actions focused during the Soviet occupation
during the 1980's to a shift in the use of direct conventional activities in
counterinsurgency operations following the attacks of September 11, 2001.”
The bulk of the codes attached to these testimonies were asymmetric-centric.
asymmetric centric approaches were utilized seventeen times during the AMG5
testimony review. The child codes and sub-codes applied resulted as follows:
asymmetric-centric-security (AC2a) was applied seven times, asymmetric-centricstability (AC2b) was applied five times, asymmetric-centric- Afghan domestic security
(AC1b) was applied four times, and asymmetric-centric-local stability (AC3b) was
applied once to the report. A finding from the American group experiences that needs to
be noted is the observation of a conventional-centric code being applied once, which is
found the sub-code area of conventional-centric-counterinsurgency (CC2a). While the
sub-code was in the area of conventional-centric and related to counterinsurgency, a
unique quality to this application was that the participant speaks of counterinsurgency for

129
not only conventional approach directly, but also for Afghan operations directly involved
in the conflict. The objective of the strategy of counterinsurgency measured in this case
is naturally inferred to be for any program directly involved in the conflict, regardless of
status.
The question of strategy and the effects of the strategic policies for Afghanistan
were posed to the participants. In a follow-up interview, (May 24, 2017) participant
AFG4 commented on the state of stability and growth in the country and the personal
impressions on foreign influences on growth. The response is summarized here: "The
United States has constructed numerous schools and built roads, yet it seems that all the
programs are based on quantity which seems to the metric that they use. But when it
comes to the quality of a program that is based on the success it is difficult to measure.
Thus nobody wants to touch it. There is not much more to say, except for the success
rate of economic growth within Afghanistan. It seems that the solution is responding to
Taliban or Haqqani Network attacks but I don't see actively setting up the compounds
and villages to be empowered to reject the terrorist.” Participant AMG4 addressed this
issue in his statement about conventional strategy in his statement: "Why, because all of
the focus has been on using military controlled counterinsurgency operations while also
trying to conduct counter-terrorism and nation-building. Right now it is how many
programs do we have, or how many organizations have their independent programs. So,
nobody questions the more important question, which is, ‘what are we accomplishing.’
‘How is the program achieve our goals?’ ‘How many people can read?’ I am not talking
about individual programs, but about all the programs as one strategy to achieve the
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strategic goal. My concern is that our leaders, as well as the nation, view all the
programs as one big operation, yet in reality, each governmental organization is doing
their own thing without thought as to how the program supports other programs and
ultimately the war effort, and regrettably, those questions aren't asked
Following the dialogue with the participant AMG4 the researcher asked if this
was just a bureaucracy using the best practice possible for organizations involved in the
process. The reaction was, "It is the amount of funding that is being wasted by the
GIRoA as well as the turmoil that the process creates? But when it is examined in details
how do we tell the warfighters that risk their lives or the taxpayers how we have been
using their lives and wasting their tax money? It is a great achievement to spend so much
blood and treasure to liberate the Afghans from the Taliban and contain Al Qaida, but I
think that level of reaching our goal is deceptive. Misleading because we focus so much
on the number of programs and money is involved in achieving success for the program
that we forget about the quality of making the country truly secure and stable."
Establishing Trustworthiness
The practice of narrative inquiry as a means for research can be described as
establishing validity grounded on the aspect that it encompasses the participant’s
experience as well as perceptions of key events in his or her life. Thus, through narrative
inquiry, the credibility of any study lies in the recovery and interpretation of the
experience and the perception of the person who experienced the events that the study
covers. In this study, as outlined in Chapter Three, the life experiences and, more
importantly, the perceptions of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan were compared to the
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policies that have been in place for the United States since Operation Enduring Freedom
began in 2001. The collection of these experiences were outlined in Chapter 3. Through
previous experience working with Afghan nationals and the U.S. Army Special Forces
soldiers, a pool of willing participants became available to the scholar. Communication
with these participants was made after they were no longer affiliated with the U.S.
Government, which allowed for unhindered relationships to be established and sequences
of dialogues between the researcher and participant to be scheduled. As part of the
narrative methodology, the research processes included coding of the testimonies, the
interview transcripts, and the researchers' field notes. This coding was completed with
the use of NVivo software and the interjection of manual observations from the
researcher's field notes. The coding process is defined in detail in a later portion of this
chapter.
Results
The objective of the research was to focus on the evidence that addresses the
central research question: How does the American strategic perceptions of an
asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict outcome and are the Afghan
public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive or negative influence
towards supporting a strong, stabilized democratic country, free from terrorist influence?
The purpose of this question was to qualify whether Afghans and Americans perceive the
current conventional strategy of employing large numbers of conventional troops on the
ground as successful – or whether an asymmetric approach would be deemed more
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welcomed. The evidence is based on the results of the interviews as described in this
chapter.
The interviews had fewer conventional centric codes applied with the transcript
analysis than the asymmetric centric codes. These codes occurred 44 times in the
interview transcripts. The child codes revealed that security was prevalent with 28 codes,
followed by stability that was applied seven times, and constancy applied nine times.
The sub-code level exposed the impact of U.S. domestic security with this code applied
16 times, followed by Afghan domestic security 12 times. Then it drops to local stability
six times, personal security four times, and economic opportunity three times. The
significance of these findings is that quite a few of the comments used in the analysis
were chosen as conventional centric to explain or justify the current strategy. To be fairminded with conveying the statements that are referenced, reports on current activities as
well as an existing policy that have a directly reflected in the testimonies and public
statements of military officials are included.
Though there are numerous explanations for the reason that there are a lower
number of conventional centric applications rather than asymmetric-centric applications,
the leading one for this researcher is the asymmetric nature of the participant's duties
while in Afghanistan. There could be various reasons that explain the limited number of
responses regarding conventional centric approaches, but the predominant point is from
the participant's interview responses. Nevertheless, these details were not immediately
exposed in the analysis. Various reasons that affect the outcome are discussed in detail
under recommendations in Chapter 5.
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Participant AFG1 stated that there are different opinions held by Afghans on the
actions of Coalition Force, particularly about the Americans – ranging from attitudes
about their presence in Afghanistan, to the results of their policies, and consequences of
their actions. For example, following the post-Soviet invasion, the country experienced
turmoil in which the Taliban rose as the dominant power in the country. The participant
specified that the perception of the Taliban between the Soviets departure and September
11 attacks were one of an era of "killing and violence, with family against the family."
The participants from the Afghan group continued to express their recollections of
the Post-Russian Taliban period; twenty comments are directly related to the security of
the country in that section. The discussion did present a unique view of the Taliban in
that, during their direct rule, for many people, the threat of theft or assault by criminals
was lessened, but fear from the Taliban using violence was constant. The anti-Taliban
feelings that erupted following the American actions of 2001-2002 was based on the
knowledge that the Taliban provided security based on fear, not stability. Participant
AFG 2 utilized the phrase "very, very brutal" several times during his interview. The
participant presented his view of the activities conducted by the Taliban: "Are a cultural
offense to Afghans.” It was during this portion of the dialogue that the participant AFG2
made clear his perceptions of the Taliban in his statement that the Taliban was
"destroying the humanity of the Afghans, while the American tried to restore it."
The influence that the U.S. conventional military demonstrates in Afghanistan
strategic policy is reported in the literature review found in Chapter 2. From the many
documents literature review, one document (Transition in Afghanistan: Losing the
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Forgotten War? The Need to Reshape US Strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central
Asia) references the conventional centric approaches employed or Afghanistan stability
(Cordesman, 2015). The surprise was that the majority of the results from the American
Group of participants also indicated a similar opinion as to the one found in Cordesman
(2015) document. Upon examining the participants' testimonies, there was a fairly even
application of codes between the child codes of conventional centric-security (CC1) and
conventional centric-stability (CC3). One category missing from the application in the
American Group was coded under the child code conventional centric welfare (CC2). A
further examination of the statements reflects that the topic is not directly related to a
particular experience. This is a predictable aspect of the coding process based on the
charge of the activity.
A report published by the Congressional Research Office Afghanistan: PostTaliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policies in 2014 tasked with providing
specifically examined concern and actions in Afghanistan to "increase the understanding
of Afghan experiences with American strategy for security assistance” (Katzman, 2014).
The document specifically addresses the use of state security and stability in the country.
The report’s executive summary notes that the aggression and violent actions that the
Taliban employ is a method of indoctrination to their ideological beliefs. The report
provided a foundation for the researcher to explore this subject with the participants but
the dialogue provided an unexpected discovery. Unlike other government or military
inferred documents found in Chapter 2, the bulk of this report pertained to what this
scholar interprets as asymmetric centric measures that were employed or should have
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been employed in Afghanistan during U.S. involvement. The testimonies from the
dialogue that the researcher established with the participants resulted in asymmetric
centric codes being used 17 times in their statements. The bulk of child codes concerned
within this document were in the asymmetric centric security category (AC1).
Specifically, the asymmetric-centric-Afghan security (AC1b) was applied three times in
the report, asymmetric centric-welfare (AC2) was applied twice (one time for each of the
sub-codes, AC2a and AC2b), and twice for asymmetric-centric local stability (AC3b).
The remainder of the codes applied was generally applied in the asymmetric centric
category.
A key point discovered through the interview process was the final two questions
that each participant received regardless of the groups. These questions, found in
Appendix A, address the perceptions of the Afghan people as to American strategy of
creating stability to combat terrorism and the large footprint of American forces. The
narrative that followed was significant in its simplicity in reaching the core of what the
participants perceive about American strategy to this researcher. Participant AFG1stated,
"My experience has taught me that violence is not really about anything. I always have
this kind of message to my own family, which is that violence begets violence. I don't
think violence gets you anywhere.” The statement continued to refer to the policy of the
Coalition forces of pursuing the Taliban and Haqqani Network members. Participant
AFG1 stated, "what the strategy to remove the Taliban and build Afghanistan through
violence, I think it created more violence that made the Taliban stronger, now when
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America leaves the Taliban will be more powerful than before because it is perceived that
they defeated America.”
Participant AFG4 made a significant statement regarding a need to change U.S.
policy towards more humanitarian interventions rather than military with the military
working with non military agencies in providing security but not managing the programs.
Participant AFG4 stated their needs to be opportunities in Afghanistan that economic and
educational prospects by stating, "they join the Taliban in regions where people are
hopeless such as Helmand and Kandahar. In those regions, the government is not
offering any services to them, where there are no clinics, where there are no schools. So
if you provide alternatives to the Taliban, then I don't see why anyone would join them.”
Participant AFG4 completed the interview with a statement that, if people have the right
incentives, they are less likely to join the ranks of the Taliban.
Participant AMG5 addressed what he believes to be a gap between the policy of
employing asymmetric centric programs in a unified method of nation building and the
reality of conventional-centric method of using the military to solve all problems. His
statement, "I believe it is never too late to change direction but it would have saved a lot
of blood and treasure if they had established an asymmetric strategy at the beginning.
Being one of the members that originally was on the ground at the very beginning we did
fine in defeating the Taliban. What went wrong is that they just held on to the mentality.
This is when it should become a little more asymmetric-centric.” This was presented as
being an asymmetric approach based on not relying on the conventional military as the
primary mover for nation building. Participant AFG5 made the opinion that the best

137
manner for the U.S. to eliminate the vast majority of troops in the country is doing a
surge for the education and other supporting humanitarian endeavors.
Summary
The data that were collected in this study was obtained and structured in an
organized manner that is consistent with the procedures outlined in Chapter 3 and
approved by the Walden University IRB. A two-step manner was employed to use the
data acquired through the analysis of testimonies of Afghan and American participants in
the conflict in Afghanistan. This data was coded with the codes listed in Appendix D
using NVivo software. The process by which the analysis took place was a three level
coding process. The sub-codes or detailed level of codes were applied first, and then the
child codes and lastly the two main codes of asymmetric-centric or conventional-centric
approaches were applied. This seemingly reversed system of coding provided a very
detailed manner of analysis and review of the testimonies and documents to prevent the
omission of any potential data that might have been missed.
The first phase of data collection provided the foundation for guidance questions
posed in a narrative inquiry of human participants that were both Afghan and Americans
who have lived in Afghanistan and had direct contact with the operations involved in
education in the country. While narrative inquiry provides details more through the
experiences of the people involved (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990), for consistency of the
study, the same codes were applied to the transcript. The data revealed some confusing
results. The most notable confusion disclosed by the data analysis is the difference
between the stated intentions of the Afghan group supporting American conventional
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military actions and the reality of shared experience through the viewpoint of the
Afghans and American who has experienced life in the Afghan War. It has been revealed
that the difference lies with the actions taken since 2003. A more detailed discussion of
this will take place in Chapter 5, as well as one concerning recommendations and
reflections gained through the study. The analysis contained in Chapter 5 will include the
implications for positive social change that the results revealed.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
In this study, the benefits or deficiencies regarding the shift of U.S. Security
Strategy to include asymmetrical alternatives to countering terrorism as opposed to a
conventional were examined. This study was conducted to determine whether an
asymmetrical strategy could be an effective alternative to the continued use of
conventional military action alone. The war in Afghanistan has continued for 16 years,
making it the longest armed conflict in the history of the United States (Taylor, 2015).
“The Costs of War,” a project of Brown University’s Watson Institute, reports that, in
total, over 149,000 people have died in the conflict since the 2001 invasion (Taylor,
2015). The report includes the deaths of American and Coalition forces to include
civilian contractors and the Afghanistan government forces as well as the 26,270 Afghan
civilian deaths and the 21,500 Pakistani civilian deaths (Taylor, 2015). According to a
separate report to Congress, the financial cost of the conflict was estimated, in 2015, to be
approximately $668 billion in Afghanistan alone (Congressional Research Service).
These figures alone make the cost of the war in Afghanistan in blood and money
staggering. By examining the potential benefits of asymmetric alternative, it may be
possible to achieve not only a decrease in financial cost, but also, more importantly, a
reduction in the human cost of the war, with the possibility of a victory in the War on
Terror.
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Restatement of the Problem
As the U.S. war on terror has continued since 2001, the strategy developed for
national security should result in the elimination of terrorist groups and stability within
conflict zones such as Afghanistan. With this strategy of using conventional force to
eliminate terrorist groups and achieving stability in Afghanistan, it can be reasonably
expected that terrorist attacks will be reduced and the need for American interaction in
Afghanistan will be diminished. There are successes in the American-Afghanistan
conflict, such as the institution of a democratic government system as opposed to the
totalitarian rule of Taliban (Cordesman, 2015). However, Afghanistan continues to
experience insurgent attacks from both Al Qaeda and Taliban forces as well as the growth
of the Haqqani Network into a regional terrorist force. Thus, it could be argued that the
Afghan War, at best, is still raging and, at worse, is a defeat for American strategy and
power (Cordesman, 2015)
Summary of the Study
In Chapter 1, the theoretical framework for the study was introduced through an
explanation of asymmetric strategy as opposed to a conventional warfare strategy, which
employs traditional military methods to defeat the threat of terrorism. This is a wideranging subject so within this chapter, the explanation as to why Afghanistan was used as
the field of research was investigated. Also included in Chapter 1 were the research
questions, the method of research employed, and the implications for positive social
change that guided this project.
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In Chapter 2, a comprehensive analysis of existing literature related to the war on
terrorism, the American strategy results of Afghanistan conflict, and the examination of
asymmetric strategy as opposed to conventional approaches were provided. The direct
relationship of the aforementioned to the involvement of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the
results of 16 years of war, and the status of the terrorist originations that the strategy was
supposed to defeat were examined. The literature review consisted of an examination of
journal articles, texts, and reports on the Afghanistan conflict, combatting terrorism, and
developing post-Cold War strategy for a post-Cold War environment. This analysis also
included how terrorist organizations recruit members and what the primary motivations
of individuals are in becoming terrorists. Much of this discussion was informed by the
asymmetric warfare theory (Arreguin-Toft, 2012) and how it relates to the motivation for
a terrorist organization to wage war on a global power.
In Chapter 3, an explanation of the foundation of the research design for the study
that included how the data were collected was presented. The study was conducted using
a qualitative methodology with a narrative inquiry approach. The narrative inquiry was
preceded by an in-depth analysis of documents that specifically dealt with strategies to
include the policies and programs for that strategy in Afghanistan. These were
examinations, testimonies, and policy statements of government agencies and
nongovernmental organizations. The narrative inquiry design is based on gaining life
experiences from participants that experienced the subject of research (Creswell, 2013).
For this research study, interviews were conducted with persons who lived in
Afghanistan and experienced first-hand the American policies and programs that the
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National Security Strategy for Afghanistan caused. The participant pool was evenly
divided into one group of educated Afghans that experienced the American strategy and a
second group that was made up of an equal number of American Special Forces soldiers
that conducted numerous tours of duty working alongside Afghans in implementing the
national strategy. To provide a stakeholders’ point of view, a document analysis coded
within the protocols established by Walden University IRB was used.
The results of data collection were discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter included
an explanation of the three levels of coding that applied to the interview transcripts as
well as the documents. In Chapter 4, the results of the narrative inquiry that consisted of
analysis of several policy documents and interviews conducted with the participants were
further addressed.
Interpretation of the Findings
The research question developed to guide this study was: How does the American
strategic perceptions of an asymmetric adversary in Afghanistan affect the conflict
outcome and are the Afghan public perceptions of the outcomes of the strategy a positive
or negative influence towards supporting a strong, stabilized democratic country free
from terrorist influence? This research question addressed the question of whether there
were positive results from this approach and whether these measurements provided the
means to eliminate or reduce the potential effects of terrorism in general. The collection
of data in the study yielded information that indicated that, at a minimum, a consistent
asymmetric approach is a possible solution to stabilizing Afghanistan in order stop
terrorism in the region. The results of this study demonstrate, also, that further research

143
should be conducted concerning actual programs enacted and measuring their success
against the national strategy to prevent terrorism. In the literature review in Chapter 2,
key documents related to strategy policies of the American government to include the
military and nongovernmental agencies were provided. This analysis revealed that it
was, and continues to be, the intention of the U.S. government to pursue a single strategic
approach to eliminating or reducing the terrorist threat in Afghanistan. However, through
the narrative inquiry, it was found that, while it may be the intention of the existing
policy to provide a successful strategic approach for a stable Afghanistan, this is not what
is occurring. This finding will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
The first stage of data collection resulted in the largest number of codes, in either
an AC theme or a CC theme. The examined documents showed that the organizations
engaged in the Afghanistan conflict have a strategic policy that intends on using
nonmilitary approaches to build a safe and secure Afghanistan. In the literature review
portion of the study, the history of the Afghanistan conflict as well as the interaction
between the American Coalition; Afghans; and the adversaries to include the Taliban, Al
Qaeda, and Haqqani Network were examined. Those examinations also provided
indications that because of the unique nature of the background of the conflict, this
particular situation dictates an approach that is different from a conventional militarycentric approach.
The focus of the strategic approach to eliminating the threat of attacks from
within Afghanistan is noble and apparently the intention of the American and Coalition
forces. However, the responses in the participants’ interviews contrasted that intention
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with specific testimonials regarding the continued conventional military action. The most
obvious outcome of this portion of the research study was that while the intention was to
provide a more military-centric approach, the Afghan citizens are not interpreting the
continued presence of American or Coalition troops as an approach to helping them. It
can be explained that the respondents felt that the military conventional-centric
approaches continued with little regard to the AC approach. Again, it must be noted that
this is simply the viewpoint of a small group of Afghans (now living abroad) as a
comparison to the indications made by the document analysis. This is certainly a
limitation, but the participants’ contribution proved to be valuable within the overall
context of the study.
While the study was a qualitative study that involved dissemination of
information from multiple sources, there should be little question as to the intention of
the documents. The data was derived from the participant group interviews and included
stakeholder documents that led to 166 codes applied to the AC approach over 44 codes
applied to the CC approach. Each of the codes was based on the words and phrases
contained in the testimonies and documents resulting from the application of using Nvivo
software for data analysis.
The most notable statements evaluated came from AMG of participants. It might
be assumed that those in AMG would have a more CC approach to any type of conflict;
however, as discussed in Chapter 4, the AMG participants testified that an AC approach
formed around providing basic human needs is the intention of the United States in
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Afghanistan. However, the respondent interviews indicated that although there may be
an intention to use an AC approach, the reality is that this method is not being followed.
Further examination and coding of testimonies as well as documents from
nonmilitary government agencies further indicated that the strategy of employing
conventional forces using or indicating the use of violent actions through a CC strategy
provoked those who suffer from it. The results indicated that a CC approach that relies
on direct violent response to terrorism would continue to incite the population toward
supporting the adversary and away from establishing a stable Afghanistan. In the results
of this study along with testimonies and documents that make up the basis of the
research, the psychological influences of human beings were not observed. The data
suggested that the more aggressive the counterterrorism activities are, the greater the
potential grows for recruiting more terrorists. The participant interviews indicated that
the philosophy of revenge is a reality and that the continued “eye for an eye” view on the
part of Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents is based on the continued actions of the United
States and the Coalition forces.
Limitations of the Study
The narrative inquiry interview was in stark contrast to the conclusions drawn
from the document analysis. It should be noted that one limitation of the narrative
inquiry was that a small group of Afghans and Americans were interviewed – and that
they are all men. The participants shared personal experiences with the American
policies in Afghanistan, so the overall impact was not revealed. This limitation is
addressed further in the recommendations section of this chapter. While the participants
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do mention the incorporation of women into Afghan policy, the limitation does not allow
for generalization of information.
The Afghan group participants experienced life in Afghanistan from the Soviet
occupation through the civil war, and Taliban takeover as well as their involvement of
American and Coalition forces beginning in 2001. The information they imparted
included the influence of the recent Afghan history and how terrorism has brought the
country to the world stage of events. The American Group provided in-depth knowledge
of American and Afghan relationship in defeating terrorism. Both groups report that the
asymmetric method of strategy that had the most influence was the provision of
education and the exchange of information.
Several comments made by the Afghan participants were related to young
Afghans that are recruited for terrorist activities within Afghanistan. These can be
examined in the perceptions of the people based on their age and influences. One notable
statement within the narrative interview was the perception of the Soviet occupation
during the AFG1 participant's elementary school days. His only remembrance and
perception of the Soviet troops in their tanks were giving him candy on his way to school.
His statement also included that the adult perception of the Soviet occupation is probably
very different. This is monumental to the point of discussing recruiting young people
into violent activities against certain targets. Based on Arreguin-Toft's (2012) discussed
in Chapter two, this particular perception could very well be one of the asymmetric
activities employed by terrorist organizations. Consequently, one conclusion made in
this situation was that perception could be enormously consequential on decision-making

147
processes regarding future strategy. As mentioned in Chapter one, a force using
conventional based strategy will make the recruitment easier for terrorist organizations
using an asymmetric method such as education and mentorship of the young.
Participant AFG1 relayed on American strategy of building Afghanistan into a
democratic country with self-rule on the implications of education and other essential
security, stability, and growth provisions for humans. This is supported by the testimony
of AFG4 on his travels throughout Afghanistan; the participant also communicated how
his family endeavors that included educational opportunities for his extended family and
friends to build a stronger and independent family.
The research question asked if the asymmetric centric approach would be a more
viable alternative to the prevention of terrorism. This is about the evidence provided in
Chapter four, which refers to both the Afghan and American participant groups reference
to the Taliban becoming stronger after it was almost eliminated in the early stages of the
conflict. The Taliban growing in strength is the critical indicator that a conventional
centric strategy is failing. The continued references to the perception of heavy handiness
by military forces and the "eye for an eye" mentality reinforces that simple force only
incites anger and, ultimately, continued attacks in a vengeful atmosphere. A limitation of
this study is the evidence that shows that human nature takes precedence over any other
influence. The participants from both groups noted, in many different places in the data
acquisition process, that there are definite thought processes for humans in an area that is
rife with terrorism. One of the most notable quotes the given was from participant
AFG1regarding the perception of the Afghan people on the American strategy: "I'll
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answer the question on the success of American strategy and that is you are not winning
the war in Afghanistan. Why is Afghanistan not improving? Why aren't you winning the
war? This is the question to ask.” This statement could be interpreted to mean that the
perception of the Afghans is that the United States and Coalition forces have little to no
thought about the actual strategy for Afghanistan and its citizens. As determined by the
literature review and data collection, the impact of personal perception is vital in
asymmetric war. The asymmetric adversary requires that the population be it a regional,
national or global based on believes that they are winning the conflict they engaged in.
For Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is making the Afghans, and the various tribes, clans and
ethnic groups believe that they are defeating the Americans. A strategy that addresses
this perception would be required to for America and the Coalition forces to win. If
American is to win than a reexamination of the strategies should occur. This includes,
not only looking at the national strategy, but also taking action that will adequately
protect the American people and reveal a more cost-effective and permanent solution
than simply entering a sovereign nation with conventional military force. After 15 years
of war, there must be some movement toward a solution that does not Afghan and
American lives. A limitation of this research is while the data analysis disclosed that
there should be an alternative, the actual activities taken have shown something different.
This is not only evident in the literature review, but also in the contrasts made through the
narrative inquiry.
The participant interviews demonstrate that it is the perception that many
Afghans, as well as Americans that have served in Afghanistan, that the U.S. is only an
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occupying force, not a force of peaceful reform. As presented in Chapter two this is the
goal of the asymmetric adversary, and it appears they are winning, based on the
perceptions of a small group narrative. There is an indication that positives could come
from this shift in strategy for the U.S., though the findings are inconclusive. This is
based on several factors. First, the study itself had limitations in the area of participants.
Since only 10 participants were willing to participate, the narrative inquiry portion of the
study only has the experiences of these ten people.
Recommendations
There are many different possible strategies, policies, and programs that the
United States could employ in Afghanistan. With the reduction to less than 10,000
combat troops that has taken place since 2014 (and now the possibility of a new strategy
requiring more troops and funding the strategy to be used in moving forward) are critical
for the success of the Afghanistan. Based on this research, the policy of the U.S.
government is already dominated with statements that an asymmetric centric strategy was
the intention for operations in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the determining factor is the
type of forces and the amount of funding committed to the region demonstrate that for the
largest part of the conflict conventional military action was the policy, which is primarily
geared towards seeking out the enemy. This is correspondingly supported by the
contrasting viewpoints from the participants’ narrative. It would be credulous to state
that in the security condition created by the 9/11 attacks with the defeat of terrorist
organizations could be solved with a 100% certainty by the use of an asymmetric
strategy. However, the research has shown some indication of the possibility of using a
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greater emphasis on asymmetric strategy that employs a unified objective, such as
employing education as an instrument in the war on terrorism. Therefore, from a national
strategy standpoint, further examination on the use of agencies such as USAID and nongovernmental agencies and the provision of all aspects of benevolent aid in these
conflicts must occur in the future. This change in strategy does not directly address
amending the direction of terrorist organizations, but as revealed in the research may
have an effect on the recruitment of future terrorists. A significant statement from
participant AFG5 considered relying on the use of force in defeating the Taliban. The
participant stated, "What was the strategy to eliminate the Taliban... just kill them all. If
the strategy was to kill the Taliban then why is there more Taliban? What has been
accomplished in the last 15 years? A Stronger Taliban now than before.” The deduction
taken from this statement is that relying on a conventional based strategy increases the
violence that, in turn, makes the Taliban stronger by recruiting newer members to carry
forward. The influence of long-term programs such as education and other humanitarian
interventions could instill a more robust sense of self-worth that should reduce the
opportunities for further recruitment. The participant did state that continued
humanitarian endeavors require a strategy committed to long-term programs that include
but not limited to providing humanitarian approaches can influence change.
An additional recommendation for future study lies in the examination of
incorporating women, both Afghan and American, into the strategy which includes
operations, education, training and what impacts to success that may exist. The narrative
inquiry used only the general information about strategy in Afghanistan. The
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examination of experiences through the experiences of women who have either received
ether impact of the strategy or implemented strategy may provide significant insights into
the potential impacts of using symmetric actions as a strategy for the future. This could
entail a physical presence in the country to conduct the interviews. This recommendation
along with an examination of psychological influences of potential terrorists could reveal
more in-depth data.
Another strong recommendation from the study is further research that delves
deeper into of what an asymmetric strategy would consist. Research that delves deeper
into the topic employing both qualitative and quantitative methods may reveal further
advantages to the use of asymmetric strategy as a means to succeed in conflicts of this
type. This study reveals some of the perceptions of current strategy and the potential
solutions of the use of an asymmetric strategy to counter terrorism. Participant AFG1
made what may be one of the most insightful comments: "When the Russians came you
helped those that would fight them, America was there and all the fighters knew it but not
one of your Marines was in Afghanistan. We, America and Afghanistan won that
conflict, now the entire American might is here and we are losing.” This statement
resounded in his observation of the past when the United States used an asymmetric
strategy in the Soviet conflict as to the present strategy of direct confrontation and
wondering what the future will be for his homeland as America begins a new chapter in
the fight for Afghanistan.
As previously stated, this study does not provide all of the answers, only answers
to the research question. Future studies should contain examinations into both the
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emotional or psychological motivations of terrorist organization recruits, as well as
deeper strategy analyses about what specific strategy, policies, and procedures could be
used in the future.
Further recommendations are based on the narrative inquiry interviews. Near the
end of the each interview, each participant was asked what their recommendation would
be to the United States concerning winning the war against the Taliban and other
terrorist-supporting organizations in Afghanistan. The recommendations were
surprisingly quite simple. The participants stated the same sentiment in their own ways,
but their perspective could be summed up by participant AFG5’s response: "the list of
things America could do would belong. But the one true thing to do is to be realistic.
There are too many things that cannot be changed, nor would they have to be
changed…bringing democracy, which was a goal in the early days, was only measured
by elections. Having elections does not guarantee a democracy. More importantly, an
election may not provide the leadership needed to win against the Taliban.” Participant
AMG5 made the most defining statement when he said: “Before democracy will flourish
Afghanistan needs a strong leader that ensure the people are prepared for it. If not the
people will not support democracy. You can’t just expect it to work if you haven’t done
any of the groundwork for it.”
A further discussion point was centered on defeating the Taliban. All the
participants have fought the Taliban for the entirety of the conflict and the comment each
made in one way or another is: “America hasn’t defeated the Taliban in 15 years of war.”
When asked whether can the Taliban be defeated, the response from the American group
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was “it was almost was defeated in 2002 and 2003.” This discussion implied that the
participants believe their defeat is possible – with an irregular approach. “A military
presence will be needed initially, but the Taliban (like any other terrorist/insurgent group)
is very fluid. It is not like Al Qaeda in that they are not outsiders, so they are not easy to
identify whom the Taliban are and who they are not.... To defeat you have been to work
on people’s attitude that they are losers which deter people from joining their ranks.”
The key to the statement was summed up by the participant AFG5 when he said: “After
America pulls out of Afghanistan the people will see the Taliban as the victor with the
power and they will be more likely to support them. The keyword used was that it was
‘survival.’”
With the withdrawal of American and Coalition forces that began in 2014, there is
the possibility that the Afghan people believe that Afghan government may provide
strength and stability for the Afghanistan. Both of the participant groups believe this is
one of the main reasons that Afghans do not speak out against the Taliban. The
perception of the participants is, again, only a small group’s perspective. However, if this
is truly the perception of Afghans after 15 years of conflict, then the study indicates a
failure in understanding the type of conflict that Afghanistan has evolved into has
occurred. If the Kabul government collapses and the Taliban regain control, it is
probable that they will again provide a safe haven for terrorist organizations. If this
happens, then, the entire Afghan experiment would have failed with not only a major
waste of lives, funding, and resources, but a significant setback in the Global War on
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Terrorism. Therefore, the asymmetric strategy approach should be examined more
thoroughly as recommended.
Implications for Positive Social Change
This project is based on the events begun on September 11, 2001. America, the
victor of the Cold War now faces an adversary that disregards the need to match the
symmetry in power against the United States. Instead, this new enemy challenges the
country to an asymmetric conflict that exploits the unbalance in power as a source to
waging war and succeeds in obtaining its strategic goals. The United States reacted by
employing its vast resources of military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic
capabilities to overwhelm the enemy in the same fashion that it won the Cold War: by
using energy, resources, and size to develop and implement a counter terrorism strategy
based on preventing terrorist attacks by overwhelming the enemy (Savun & Phillips,
2009).
The question is, how does the American counter terrorism strategy of preventing a
terrorist attack relate to defeating an asymmetrical foe? In searching for an answer, this
study has reviewed numerous findings on the impact of foreign policy to include military
actions as it relates to terrorism. Yet, few studies address the structure of the strategy in
defeating the asymmetrical threat. This is compounded by the additional question, after
16 years of using the American conventional might in military, political, and judicial
capabilities whether American dominance in conventional warfare is linked to an
increase in terrorist activities against the American interest and instability in the region in
which so much blood and treasure has been spent (Sobek & Brathwauite, 2005). The
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implications for social change are in the methodologies that American leadership
employs to develop the strategies of national security as it relates to terrorism. This study
reveals the impact of asymmetric war as it is practiced against the United States, with the
core of the study examining the asymmetries of the will of one opponent over another.
Thus, social change is altering the way we look at the War on Terror – as not a war on a
terrorist organization, but a conflict of wills in which an opponent believes he or she is
fighting for a vital interest, such as survival, and will use all avenues of human
interaction as means to achieve their goals (Khouri, 2008).
The first and most obvious observation is that an asymmetric strategy that not
only counters but defeats an asymmetric enemy would have positive effects on the
amount money and blood spent in any action of this type. The document analysis
indicates that the intention of the current strategy is to provide security, stabilization, and
economic growth. This was made apparent in the majority of the documents discussed in
the Chapter two, as well as the primary motivation for the narrative inquiry. To instigate
positive social change, the objectives must be made a reality. While the American
leadership forms strategy based on America’s need for security through the intended
strategy to build security, stability and economic growth for Afghanistan, the actions
resulting from this strategy are not being perceived as such by the Afghans or the
Americans implementing the strategy. A shift in creating an asymmetric strategy that is
directly reflected by the attitudes and perceptions of the Afghans and the people that
implement the strategy into a reality will be necessary. An asymmetric centric approach
to a global counterterrorism strategy using Afghanistan as the initial test of the strategy
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could save not only lives, but also become a concrete approach to solving similar
conflicts in the future. However, the data in this study alone does not support this
opinion. The strongest implication this study has on positive social change is that, while
the U.S. strategy provides a semblance of social change, these objectives must be made
into a reality of winning the war by the United States affecting positive social change in
the country of Afghanistan.
Conclusion
This research study was an analysis of data covering one part of a larger problem.
The research questions centered on discovering the answer to one portion of an
asymmetric conflict and that is: what is the perception that the Afghans and Americans
who fight the war have about the American strategy to win it? The research indicates that
there are many positive ways to provide an asymmetric strategy by providing basic
assistance to the people of Afghanistan. The employment of conventional military forces
in the role of counterterrorism/counterinsurgency has proven to be less successful in
previous involvement by the U.S. in an effort to protect itself. As presented in Chapter
two, involvement in asymmetrical conflicts such as Vietnam and (more recently) in
Somalia by U.S. conventional forces ended in less than favorable conditions. Yet, the
intentions of the United States are not the reality that the Afghan people perceive – nor is
it the reality that is perceived by Americans on the ground in Afghanistan. While some
headway has been made in basic humanitarian aid, the focus has still remained on the
conventional military intervention. As the years progress after the withdrawal of
American and Coalition forces, the world will see exactly how the internal workings of
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the country will progress. Based on the results of the analysis presented, this could
possibly mean either Afghanistan will follow a democratic government model or revert to
the Taliban rule of religious-based tyranny way. Should control revert back to the
Taliban, the actions of the past 15 years will have been wasted.
This research demonstrates that, when facing asymmetrical adversaries, the
United States need not seek a conventional military solution to conduct counterterrorism
activities, but must instead recognize that an asymmetrical war is a war of will power, not
firepower. The results of the data from this study support what Kristensen (2009)
observes in that the United States and other nations will need to get past the reliance on
the military sweeping the field of battle of its foes through fire power and technology and
find a way to work out the different methods in responding to the long war that
asymmetrical conflict represents. Scholars in the field have demonstrated that an
asymmetric battleground is very fluid and the best way to prepare for this is by allowing
everyone (soldiers, diplomats, and especially the target population) to be as dynamic as
they need to be in order to win (Morris, 2003). Part of having an asymmetric strategy
would include such things as being able to quickly respond and enact changes without the
need for a long and disenfranchised chain of command approval. By having the mind of
someone considered to be free thinkers, and then being able to think outside the box, the
asymetric conflict theory could be applied in rapid and successful fashion. One such
example might be that, instead of a instilling democracy, maybe reestasblishing a
democratic monarchy would provide a solution for a working government (Morris,
2003).
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There are many lessons that can be learned from the last 16 years of American
involvement in Afghanistan. The greatest lesson that should be learned is that when
conventional military actions involve a civilian population, all that is remembered is that
there was death and destruction. As a global leader, as well as a sovereign nation, the
United States of America should take the lead in setting an example in protecting, not
only itself, but all those who oppose tyranny. A large part of this example is finding a
more permanent solution than simply committing to conventional military action.
A larger portion of this issue lies within the inconclusive results of this study.
The fact that the United States has expressed its intentions of providing humanitarian
support and has spent billions on aid, it has not followed through in a productive manner.
For the United States to effect a permanent solution, not only for itself, but also for its
global partners, protection from asymmetrical adversaries such as terrorist organizations
will have to be properly perceived by persons around the globe. The fact that the
Afghanistan War has become the longest war in American history demonstrates that the
intention may be present, but actions are not accomplishing the strategic goal. At a
minimum, the employment of an asymmetric strategy to counter an asymmetric adversary
is an approach that should be researched further and examined for its positive
implications.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol
Interview Protocol and Interview Questions
A key standard for qualitative data analysis and collection is the research
discovering that everything observed, either deliberately or accidently, is potential data.
The qualitative researcher would not restrict the scope of data collection in an inflexible
manner, such as enforcing formal rules that decide which data is irrelevant without first
reviewing what the data is. With this in mind, this scholar will discover the frustration in
collecting, organizing and analyzing data can create the complications of determining
validity as well as having data overload. The problem of data overload is in some ways
more intractable. The evaluator must continually make decisions about what data are
relevant and may change these decisions over the course of the project. The evaluator
must work to focus the data collection process so that data is recovered, catalogued and
coded and if necessary retrievable as the analysis takes place (Creswell, 2013).
This narrative inquiry is designed to examine the life experiences regarding their
perspectives of and experiences with the American national security strategy as a viewed
through the analysis of individual’s story that is a foundation of the larger influences
created by counter-terrorism national strategy as it pertains to Afghanistan. The research
will focus on two groups of participants, the Afghan nationals that worked with US
Government personnel and the former US Government personnel that implemented
American strategy in Afghanistan. The manner for interviews will be in person and when
the participants are separated by great distance in which personal interviews are not
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practical that the interview will be via Skype on a secured internet connection. This
environment and approach will allow the inquiry participant to be in his or her own
comfortable setting and deliver all interview answers via Skype. The participants are
identified from a field gathered personal experience with US Army Special Forces and
the Afghanistan citizens while serving in Afghanistan.
The questions are meant to elicit a story of the participant’s complete life
experiences. This includes any life experiences prior to the intervention of the United
States following the September 11, 2001 attacks and experiences after U.S. intervention
with the policies and programs created to support the national strategy. These will cover
the years between 2001 and 2016. Specific follow up questions such as “how did this
influence your perceptions” or “how did this make you feel” may be added to each area.
The data collection is a narrative inquiry and this will entail gathering many details
concerning the life influences of the participant.
No video will be recorded. However, two digital audio recorders will be used
during each interview session to assure that each interview is securely attained. It is
planned that no more than three interview sessions will be needed and each interview
session will not exceed 45 minutes but more interviews may be needed pending on the
data recorded and analyzed. As a means of supporting the data collection and analyses
extensive field notes will be taken by the researcher to sync discussion points and add an
observation element. The field notes will contain observations made by the researcher in
regard to body language, facial expressions, or a change in the tone of voice.
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The participant consent process will include a signed consent, with a full
description of the study. All participant consent request will be read to the participant
prior to each session in order to provide a clear understanding of the purpose and
structure of the session. The participant will also be given the opportunity to read the
main interview questions as well. This includes a reassurance that the identity will be
kept confidential and all research data will remain secure.
Proposed Interview Questions
The following questions will be used to guide the semi-structured interviews of the
participants:
1. What are your experiences with the American involvement in removing the
Taliban and establishing the current Afghanistan government? (Affective)
2. What is your current attitude towards American involvement in Afghanistan?
(Conative)
3. Do the American policies in security and stability program help you with your
standard of living? (Cognitive, Affective, Conative)
4. How do you think factors in American policies and programs from 2002 to
present encourage you to support similar programs? (Cognitive)
5. What are your perceptions with regard to the American policies and programs
countering the Taliban insurgency and defeating terrorist like Al Qaida?
(Cognitive)
6. Do you feel like the policies and program helps you alleviate your problems in
terms of long-term security and stability? (Affective)
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7. Do you think that the application of the policies and program is fair and just to all
Afghans in the rural as well as the urban areas of Afghanistan? (Cognitive)
8. Do you think that American policies and programs can help in attaining and
independent safe and security Afghanistan free of controlling terrorism, criminal
and radical organizations that use terror and violence as means to maintain control
over the population? (Cognitive)
9. What elements are still lacking in the American strategy to make Afghanistan a
safe and secure independent state? (Cognitive)
10. Why do you think that American strategy to include the policies and programs
that it created is successful in making Afghanistan safe and secure? (Cognitive)
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Appendix B: Invitation to Participate
Telephone Script
Hello, my name is Bob Hayworth, and I am a doctoral student at Walden University.
Do you have a few minutes to talk?
I will be conducting a study to examine the strategy that has been developed and
employed by the United States to counter terrorism and utilized during the conflict in
Afghanistan. The core to the research is determining what approaches can a strategic
policy of employing conventional military forces in effects-based operations increase the
effectiveness of military operations against an asymmetric adversary? Basically, how can
using a strategy based on employing a modified Cold War organized and trained
conventional force defeat a foe that adapts to challenging the nation’s will within all
environments that touch society.
I would like to invite you to participate in my study. Your involvement will be limited to
a 60 minute or less virtual videoconference and providing available documents for my
review. Confidentiality will be assured, and since your participation is voluntary, you
can discontinue your involvement in the study at any time.
If you are willing to participate, I would like to email a consent form for your review that
delineates more information on the study to include some sample questions. From what I
have outlined, do you have an interest in participating?
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Appendix C: Coding Tree
Conventional-Centric

Asymmetric-Centric

Security
CC-1

Growth
CC-2

Stability
CC-3

Security
AC-1

Growth
AC-2

Stability
AC-3

US Security
CC-1a

Rule of
Law
CC-2a

Regional
Stability
CC-3a

US
Security
AC-1a

Rule of
Law
AC-2a

Regional
Stability
AC-3a

Afghan
Domestic
Security
CC-1b

Personal
Security
CC-2b

Local
Stability
CC-3b

Afghan
Security
AC-1b

Personal
Security
AC-2b

Local
Stability
AC-3b

Due to the nature of the study, a use of codes that are similar is necessary. In order to
answer the research question regarding strategy that creates actions that could have
influences on terrorism through conventional-centric (military interventions) using
applied violence (direct actions) to remove the Taliban or asymmetric-centric through
building and assisting the citizens of the region (humanitarian, business develop, and
special ops interventions), it is necessary to have the codes that are different, yet share
attributes for these areas. There are a limited number of codes secondary to the specific
target of the study. More codes are not necessary to answer the research question. These
are specific for the research question and will address the general nature of the research
questions

